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Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Marco Ottaviani, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2296, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5330-5347, July.
  3. Francisco Poggi & Bruno Strulovici, 2020. "Liability Design with Information Acquisition," Papers 2012.05066, arXiv.org.
  4. Shiri Alon & Sarah Auster & Gabi Gayer & Stefania Minardi, 2023. "Persuasion With Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_443, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  5. Alexander Frankel & Maximilian Kasy, 2022. "Which Findings Should Be Published?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 1-38, February.
  6. Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 0. "Contracting over persistent information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  7. Shaofei Jiang, 2024. "Costly Persuasion by a Partially Informed Sender," Papers 2401.14087, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  8. Maximilian Kasy & Jann Spiess, 2022. "Rationalizing Pre-Analysis Plans:Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," Economics Series Working Papers 975, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. Pëllumb Reshidi & Alessandro Lizzeri & Leeat Yariv & Jimmy H. Chan & Wing Suen, 2021. "Individual and Collective Information Acquisition: An Experimental Study," NBER Working Papers 29557, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023. "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    • Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  11. Kiri, Bralind & Lacetera, Nicola & Zirulia, Lorenzo, 2018. "Above a swamp: A theory of high-quality scientific production," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 827-839.
  12. Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro, 2018. "Hierarchical experimentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 365-404.
  13. Yeon-Koo Che & Konrad Mierendorff, 2019. "Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(8), pages 2993-3029, August.
  14. Liao, Xiaoye, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
  15. Dahm, Matthias & González, Paula & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2018. "The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 21-32.
  16. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 705-721, October.
  17. Julien Jacob & Caroline Orset, 2020. "Innovation, information, lobby and tort law under uncertainty," Working Papers of BETA 2020-25, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  18. Maximilian Kasy & Jann Spiess, 2022. "Optimal Pre-Analysis Plans: Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," Papers 2208.09638, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
  19. Yichuan Lou, 2023. "Private Experimentation, Data Truncation, and Verifiable Disclosure," Papers 2305.04231, arXiv.org.
  20. Alfredo Di Tillio & Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2021. "Strategic Sample Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 911-953, March.
  21. Mike Felgenhauer & Fangya Xu, 2021. "The Face Value Of Arguments With And Without Manipulation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 277-293, February.
  22. Bizzotto, Jacopo & Rüdiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien, 2020. "Testing, disclosure and approval," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  23. Vasudha Jain & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Whose Bias?," Papers 2111.10335, arXiv.org.
  24. Samuel Häfner & Curtis R. Taylor, 2022. "On young Turks and yes men: optimal contracting for advice," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 63-94, March.
  25. Pëllumb Reshidi & Alessandro Lizzeri & Leeat Yariv & Jimmy Chan & Wing Suen, 2022. "Individual and Collective Information Acquisition: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 312, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  26. Federico Echenique & Kevin He, 2021. "Screening $p$-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait," Papers 2103.09164, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  27. Kolb, Aaron M., 2019. "Strategic real options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 344-383.
  28. Herresthal, Claudia, 2022. "Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  29. Raphael Boleslavsky, 2023. "Waiting for Fake News," Papers 2304.04053, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
  30. Zeinab Aboutalebi & Ayush Pant, 2021. "Believe ... and you are there. On Self-Confidence and Feedback," Working Papers 64, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
  31. Davide Viviano & Kaspar Wuthrich & Paul Niehaus, 2021. "When should you adjust inferences for multiple hypothesis testing?," Papers 2104.13367, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
  32. Andrew McClellan, 2022. "Experimentation and Approval Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2215-2247, September.
  33. Maxim Senkov, 2022. "Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade," Papers 2210.08294, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  34. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
  35. Felgenhauer, Mike, 2021. "Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 400-408.
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