Delegation versus authority
[Delegation versus Autorität]
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Dezso Szalay, 2000. "Optimal Delegation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0749, Econometric Society.
- Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 1999.
"Self-Confidence And Social Interactions,"
151, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
- Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2000. "Self-Confidence and Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 7585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Benabou, R. & Tirole, J., 2000. "Self-Confidence and Social Interactions," Papers 210, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- R. Benabou & J. Tirole, 1999. "Self-Confidence and Social Interactions," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Marco Battaglini, 2002.
"Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
- Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Marco Battaglini, 2000. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1557, Econometric Society.
- Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
- Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants," Papers 005, Departmental Working Papers.
- Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
More about this item
KeywordsDelegation; Partial Contracting; Mechanism Design; Imperfect Commitment; Transferable Utility;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0226. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/mpswzde.html .