Delegation versus authority
[Delegation versus Autorität]
The paper studies the role of delegation and authority within a principal-agent relation in which a non-contractible action has to be taken. The agent has private information relevant for the principal, but has policy preferences different from the principal. Consequently, an information revelation problem arises. We contribute to the literature by assuming transferable utility and contractibility of messages and decision rights. While delegation leads to loss of control, it facilitates the agent’s participation and leads to an informed decision. Moreover, message-contingent delegation creates incentives for information revelation. We derive the optimal contract for the principal and investigate when delegation outperforms authority.
|Date of creation:||2002|
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- Marco Battaglini, 2002.
"Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
- Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Marco Battaglini, 2000. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1557, Econometric Society.
- Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
- Szalay, Dezsö, 2000.
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
00-29, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Dezso Szalay, 2000. "Optimal Delegation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0749, Econometric Society.
- R. Benabou & J. Tirole, 1999.
"Self-Confidence and Social Interactions,"
Princeton Economic Theory Papers
00s2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Self-Confidence And Social Interactions," Working Papers 151, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
- Benabou, R. & Tirole, J., 2000. "Self-Confidence and Social Interactions," Papers 210, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2000. "Self-Confidence and Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 7585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants," Papers 005, Departmental Working Papers.
- Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society.
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