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Disclosure depends on who listens: Revealing harm to consumers and competitors

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  • Schulte, Elisabeth
  • Friehe, Tim

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  • Schulte, Elisabeth & Friehe, Tim, 2025. "Disclosure depends on who listens: Revealing harm to consumers and competitors," VfS Annual Conference 2025 (Cologne): Revival of Industrial Policy 325372, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc25:325372
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
    2. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Markets, Torts, and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 300-323, Summer.
    3. Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 2016. "Correlated Accidents," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 18(2), pages 358-384.
    4. Liu, Dong & Varki, Sajeev, 2021. "The spillover effect of product recalls on competitors’ market value: The role of corporate product reliability," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 452-463.
    5. Juan-José Ganuza & Jos Jansen, 2013. "Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 845-876, December.
    6. Jos Jansen, 2008. "Information Acquisition and Strategic Disclosure in Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 113-148, March.
    7. Pak Hung Au & Keiichi Kawai, 2021. "Competitive disclosure of correlated information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 767-799, October.
    8. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Markets, torts, and social inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 300-323, June.
    9. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2012. "Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 360-379.
    10. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2014. "Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(2), pages 371-400.
    11. repec:oup:alecon:v:18:y:2016:i:2:p:358-384. is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Raith, Michael, 1996. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 260-288, October.
    13. Sengupta Aditi, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Disclosure of Environmental Risk," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 1-9, April.
    14. Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(3), pages 433-446.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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