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The true art of the tax deal: Evidence of aid flows and bilateral double tax agreements

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  • Braun, Julia
  • Zagler, Martin

Abstract

Nash bargaining model shows that a deal is struck only if both countries mutually benefit. • The model predicts voluntary signature of asymmetric double tax agreements only if there is compensation for the capital importer. Empirical evidence indicates that foreign aid from the capital exporter to the capital importer increases on average by 6 million USD In the signature year of a double tax agreement

Suggested Citation

  • Braun, Julia & Zagler, Martin, 2017. "The true art of the tax deal: Evidence of aid flows and bilateral double tax agreements," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168084, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168084
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    Cited by:

    1. Azémar, Céline & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2019. "Tax sparing agreements, territorial tax reforms, and foreign direct investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 89-108.
    2. Petr Janský & Jan Láznička & Miroslav Palanský, 2021. "Tax treaties worldwide: Estimating elasticities and revenue foregone," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 359-401, May.
    3. Kudła, Janusz & Kopczewska, Katarzyna & Stachowiak-Kudła, Monika, 2023. "Trade, investment and size inequalities between countries and the asymmetry in double taxation agreements," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    4. Anh D. Pham & Ha Pham & Kim Cuong Ly, 2019. "Double Taxation Treaties as a Catalyst for Trade Developments: A Comparative Study of Vietnam’s Relations with ASEAN and EU Member States," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-16, November.

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    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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