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Abolishing Public Guarantees in the Absence of Market Discipline

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  • Schnabel, Isabel
  • Körner, Tobias

Abstract

This paper shows that the abolition of state guarantees to publicly owned banks in Germany resulted in an increase in refinancing costs at German savings banks. Rather than being the result of increased market discipline, the increase in refinancing costs is shown to be driven by spillover effects from German Landesbanken who themselves had suffered from the abolition of guarantees and who spread their own cost increase through the public banking network. Higher refinancing costs and the resulting drop in bank charter values translated into higher risk-taking at German savings banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Schnabel, Isabel & Körner, Tobias, 2012. "Abolishing Public Guarantees in the Absence of Market Discipline," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 65401, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc12:65401
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sironi, Andrea, 2003. " Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 443-472, June.
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    5. Upper, Christian & Worms, Andreas, 2004. "Estimating bilateral exposures in the German interbank market: Is there a danger of contagion?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 827-849, August.
    6. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 2002. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1373-1406, October.
    7. Reint Gropp & Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2011. "Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 2084-2120.
    8. Reint Gropp & Christian Gruendl & Andre Guettler, 2014. "The Impact of Public Guarantees on Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 18(2), pages 457-488.
    9. Boyd, John H. & Runkle, David E., 1993. "Size and performance of banking firms : Testing the predictions of theory," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 47-67, February.
    10. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
    11. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2010. "Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 156-168, September.
    12. Harald Hau & Marcel Thum, 2009. "Subprime crisis and board (in-) competence: private versus public banks in Germany," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 24, pages 701-752, October.
    13. Isabel Schnabel, 2005. "The Role of Liquidity and Implicit Guarantees in the German Twin Crisis of 1931," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_5, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gropp, Reint E. & Guettler, Andre & Saadi, Vahid, 2015. "Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency," IWH Discussion Papers 7/2015, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    2. Alexander Schäfer & Isabel Schnabel & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, 2016. "Bail-in expectations for European banks: Actions speak louder than words," ESRB Working Paper Series 07, European Systemic Risk Board.
    3. Markus Fischer & Christa Hainz & Jörg Rocholl & Sascha Steffen, 2014. "Government Guarantees and Bank Risk Taking Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 4706, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Markus Fischer & Christa Hainz & Jörg Rocholl & Sascha Steffen, 2012. "Wie wirkt sich der Wegfall staatlicher Garantien auf die Risikoübernahme von Banken aus?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 65(18), pages 17-21, October.
    5. Kaposty, Florian & Pfingsten, Andreas & Domikowsky, Christian, 2017. "Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Competitive Advantages: Evidence from the Financial Crisis," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168146, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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