IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/umiodp/072016.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The strongest link in a weak team? Performance of players with and without outside options in relegated football clubs

Author

Listed:
  • Müller, Michael

Abstract

In this study the performance of players in relegated German football clubs is analysed, in particular the change in their contribution to team production. The players in the data sample differ regarding their outside options. Different career opportunities of players may have two effects when their current team struggles against relegation. First, players with outside options should be less motivated compared to the reference group. Second, risk attitudes of players who lack career opportunities may change. The empirical results show that players with outside options contribute less to the teams overall running distance before they are transferred to league opponents. Players who stayed after relegation with their teams played more incomplete passes, which indicates that they are more willing to take risks. Effort levels of staying players get higher, but leaving players might have superior playing talent.

Suggested Citation

  • Müller, Michael, 2016. "The strongest link in a weak team? Performance of players with and without outside options in relegated football clubs," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 07/2016, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:072016
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/144874/1/864733895.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Egon Franck & Stephan Nüesch, 2012. "Talent And/Or Popularity: What Does It Take To Be A Superstar?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(1), pages 202-216, January.
    2. Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 38(2), pages 112-134.
    3. Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2014. "Building Reputation For Contract Renewal: Implications For Performance Dynamics And Contract Duration," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 549-574, June.
    4. David J. Berri & Anthony C. Krautmann, 2006. "Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(3), pages 536-546, July.
    5. Stefan Zeisberger & Dennis Vrecko & Thomas Langer, 2012. "Measuring the time stability of Prospect Theory preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 359-386, March.
    6. Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
    7. Bernd Frick & Gunnar Pietzner & Joachim Prinz, 2007. "Career Duration a Competitive Environment: The Labor Market for Soccer Players in Germany," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 429-442, Summer.
    8. Anthony C. Krautmann & John L. Solow, 2009. "The Dynamics of Performance Over the Duration of Major League Baseball Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 10(1), pages 6-22, February.
    9. Kevin J. Stiroh, 2007. "Playing For Keeps: Pay And Performance In The Nba," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 145-161, January.
    10. Néstor Gandelman, 2008. "Mobility Among Employers and Assortative Matching," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 9(4), pages 351-370, August.
    11. Nikolaus Beck & Mark Meyer, 2012. "Modeling team performance," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 335-356, August.
    12. Pamela Wicker & Joachim Prinz & Daniel Weimar & Christian Deutscher & Thorsten Upmann, 2013. "No Pain, No Gain? Effort and Productivity in Professional Soccer," International Journal of Sport Finance, Fitness Information Technology, vol. 8(2), pages 124-139, May.
    13. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert & Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2009. "Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 221-232, August.
    14. Manel Baucells & Antonio Villasís, 2010. "Stability of risk preferences and the reflection effect of prospect theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(1), pages 193-211, February.
    15. Edward P. Lazear, 2004. "The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages 141-163, February.
    16. Babatunde Buraimo & Bernd Frick & Michael Hickfang & Rob Simmons, 2015. "The Economics of Long-term Contracts in the Footballers' Labour Market," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 62(1), pages 8-24, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Z20 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - General
    • Z22 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - Labor Issues
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:072016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ilmuede.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.