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The strategic effect of debt in dynamic price competition with fluctuating demand

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  • Neubecker, Leslie

Abstract

This paper shows that obligations from debt hinder tacit collusion if equity owners are protected by limited liability. In contrast to its advantageous commitment value in short-run competition, leverage reduces profits from infinite interaction. Contrasting uncorrelated shocks with a cyclical demand development, we show that in the first case optimal pricing is anticyclical. With demand cycles, it is anticyclical only if equity holders place a low value on future profits, but procyclical otherwise. In both cases, the cyclicity of prices increases with the debt level. Contrary to traditional wisdom, a lower degree of homogeneity may raise profits of leveraged firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Neubecker, Leslie, 2002. "The strategic effect of debt in dynamic price competition with fluctuating demand," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 250, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:250
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Rostek, Stefan & Schöbel, Rainer, 2006. "Risk preference based option pricing in a fractional Brownian market," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 299, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    3. Pitterle, Ingo A. & Steffen, Dirk, 2004. "Welfare effects of fiscal policy under alternative exchange rate regimes: the role of the scale variable of money demand," MPRA Paper 13047, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2004.
    4. Koepke, Nikola & Baten, Joerg, 2005. "The biological standard of living in Europe during the last two millennia," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 61-95, April.
    5. Stadler, Manfred, 2003. "Innovation and growth: The role of labor-force qualification," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 255, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    6. Baten, Jörg & Wallusch, Jacek, 2003. "Market integration and disintegration of Poland and Gemany [Germany] in the 18th century," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 268, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    capital structure; dynamic competition; collusion; Preiswettbewerb; Kapitalstruktur; Kollusion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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