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Too Big To Fail: Ein gordischer Knoten für die Finanzmarktaufsicht?

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  • Kellermann, Kersten

Abstract

Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden wesentlichen Merkmale eines Too Big To Fail (TBTF) Regimes diskutiert. Hierunter wird ein politisches Umfeld verstanden, in dem grosse, systemrelevante Finanzinstitute durch staatliche Massnahmen vor der Insolvenz gerettet werden. Das TBTF Regime rechtfertigt sich aus den hohen und gesellschaftlich nicht akzeptierten Kosten des Marktaustritts dieser Institutionen. Gleichzeitig rührt das TBTF Regime an den Grundfesten marktwirtschaftlicher Ordnung, indem die Selektionsfunktion des Marktes ausgeschaltet wird. Dauer-haft können Marktwirtschaften auf diese Funktion jedoch nicht verzichten. Die mit dem TBTF verbundene implizite Staatsgarantie für grosse systemrelevante Finanzinstitute führt zu negativen Wohlfahrtseffekten und schafft Anreize für Finanzinstitute, über die optimale Betriebsgrösse hinaus zu wachsen. Dazu kommt das soziale Risiko, dass die finanziellen Probleme kollabierender Grossbanken die Rettungskapazitäten der öffentlichen Haushalte und der Zentralbanken über-steigen. Der Zusammenbruch einer Grossbank kann dann die monetäre und finanzpolitische Autonomie einer Volkswirtschaft gefährden. Die Erfahrungen aus der Finanzkrise 2007/08 haben deutlich gemacht, dass es an der Zeit ist, die Vogelstrausspolitik im Umgang mit TBTF aufzugeben.

Suggested Citation

  • Kellermann, Kersten, 2010. "Too Big To Fail: Ein gordischer Knoten für die Finanzmarktaufsicht?," KOFL Working Papers 6, Konjunkturforschungsstelle Liechtenstein (KOFL), Vaduz.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:koflwp:6
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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Brunhart, 2013. "Der Klein(st)staat Liechtenstein und seine grossen Nachbarländer: Eine wachstums- und konjunkturanalytische Gegenüberstellung," Arbeitspapiere 44, Liechtenstein-Institut.
    2. Kellermann, Kersten & Schlag, Carsten-Henning, 2010. "Eine effektive Alternative zur Leverage Ratio," KOFL Working Papers 8, Konjunkturforschungsstelle Liechtenstein (KOFL), Vaduz.
    3. Kellermann, Kersten & Schlag, Carsten-Henning, 2010. "Das Schweizer Eigenmittelregime für Grossbanken: Work in Progress," KOFL Working Papers 7, Konjunkturforschungsstelle Liechtenstein (KOFL), Vaduz.
    4. Günther, Susanne, 2013. "Eine ökonomische Analyse der Systemrelevanz von Banken," Arbeitspapiere 139, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
    5. Jan Koleśnik & Anna Dąbkowska, 2021. "Methods for alleviating the problem of Too big to fail in Germany," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(1), pages 11-23, March.
    6. Kersten Kellermann & Carsten-Henning Schlag, 2010. "Eine effektive Alternative zur Leverage Ratio," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 63(16), pages 26-34, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Too Big To Fail; Finanzsektor; implizite Staatsgarantie; Betriebsgrösse; economies of scale; economies of scope; Too Big To Rescue; Island; Schweiz;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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