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Prioritäten für den globalen Aids-Fonds: eine ökonomische Analyse

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  • Stolpe, Michael

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  • Stolpe, Michael, 2001. "Prioritäten für den globalen Aids-Fonds: eine ökonomische Analyse," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 2657, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:2657
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rao, Vijayendra & Gupta, Indrani & Jana, Smarajit, 2000. "Sex workers and the cost of safe sex - the compensating differential for condom use in Calcutta," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2334, The World Bank.
    2. Kremer, Michael R., 1998. "Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," Scholarly Articles 3693705, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. Michael Kremer, 1998. "Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(4), pages 1137-1167.
    4. Bishai, David & Lin, Maria K. & Kiyonga, C.W.B., 2000. "Algorithms for purchasing AIDS vaccines," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2321, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Stolpe, 2003. "Weltweiter Patentschutz für pharmazeutische Innovationen: Gibt es sozialverträgliche Alternativen?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(4), pages 437-448, November.

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