Prioritäten für den globalen Aids-Fonds: eine ökonomische Analyse
No abstract is available for this item.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel|
Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 8814528
Web page: http://www.ifw-kiel.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kremer, Michael R., 1998. "Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," Scholarly Articles 3693705, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Bishai, David & Lin, Maria K. & Kiyonga, C.W.B., 2000. "Algorithms for purchasing AIDS vaccines," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2321, The World Bank.
- Michael Kremer, 1998. "Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(4), pages 1137-1167.
- Rao, Vijayendra & Gupta, Indrani & Jana, Smarajit, 2000. "Sex workers and the cost of safe sex - the compensating differential for condom use in Calcutta," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2334, The World Bank.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:2657. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.