Weltweiter Patentschutz für pharmazeutische Innovationen: Gibt es sozialverträgliche Alternativen?
This article discusses alternative incentive mechanisms for encouraging pharmaceutical innovations that support global health policy priorities. It concludes that Michael Kremer's proposal of patent buyouts, in which a public fund pays a mark-up on private valuations of patents from sealed-bid second-price auctions, should be adapted to serve global health needs. This could boost the efficiency of research and technology diffusion in areas suffering severe market failures, like vaccine research to fight international epidemics of infectious diseases. Finally, the paper outlines a strategy for the proposal's implementation, tapping the expected financial savings to key players within the international health economy. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2003
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 4 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1465-6493|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1465-6493|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459 Elsevier.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1982. "A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 671-88, May.
- Z. John Lu & William S. Comanor, 1998. "Strategic Pricing Of New Pharmaceuticals," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 108-118, February.
- Branko Milanovic, 2002.
"True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 51-92, January.
- Milanovic, Branko, 1999. "True world income distribution, 1988 and 1993 - first calculations, based on household surveys alone," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2244, The World Bank.
- Branko milanovic, 2003. "True world income distribution, 1988 and 1993: First calculation based on household surveys alo," HEW 0305002, EconWPA.
- William Jack & Jean O. Lanjouw, 2005.
"Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?,"
World Bank Economic Review,
World Bank Group, vol. 19(1), pages 45-67.
- William Jack & Jean O. Lanjouw, 2003. "Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?," Working Papers 28, Center for Global Development.
- Wright, Brian Davern, 1983. "The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 691-707, September.
- Tom Lee & Louis L. Wilde, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 429-436.
- Stolpe, Michael, 2001. "Prioritäten für den globalen Aids-Fonds: eine ökonomische Analyse," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 2657, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Kremer, Michael R., 1998. "Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," Scholarly Articles 3693705, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Michael Kremer, 1998. "Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(4), pages 1137-1167.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:4:y:2003:i:4:p:437-448. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.