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Market runs of hedge funds during financial crises

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  • Sung, Sangwook
  • Cho, Hoon
  • Ryu, Doojin

Abstract

A hedge fund's capital structure is fragile because uninformed fund investors are highly loss sensitive and easily withdraw capital in response to bad news. Hedge fund managers, sharing common investors and interacting with each other through market price, sensitively react to other funds' investment decisions. In this environment, panic-based market runs can arise not because of systematic risk but because of the fear of runs. The authors find that when the market regime changes from a normal state to a "bad" state (in which runs are possible), hedge funds reduce investment prior to runs. In addition, the market runs are more likely to occur in a market where hedge funds hold greater market exposure and uninformed traders have greater sensitivity to past price movement.

Suggested Citation

  • Sung, Sangwook & Cho, Hoon & Ryu, Doojin, 2019. "Market runs of hedge funds during financial crises," Economics Discussion Papers 2019-31, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201931
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    market sustainability; market runs; hedge funds; limits of arbitrage; financial crises; synchronization risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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