IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Merging automobile regulatory bodies: The case of Atlantic Canada

  • Boyer, M. Martin
  • Schiller, Jörg

The recent automobile liability insurance crisis in Atlantic Canada has prompted the four provincial legislations (Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island) to setup a task force to redesign, if necessary, the personal automobile insurance system. After reviewing some of the most interesting new regulatory changes, our paper proposes a new area of discussion: The merger of the four provincial insurance regulatory bodies to combat insurance fraud. We base our paper on the principle that recent premium increases are mainly due to an increase in insurance fraud. We show that merging the regulatory bodies may reduce insurance fraud if the merger allows savings on the average audit cost and on the development of better fraud detection technology. Finally, we suggest a fraud reducing insurance taxation scheme to finance insurance fraud investigations.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance in its series Working Papers on Risk and Insurance with number 11.

in new window

Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:hzvwps:11
Contact details of provider: Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Winter, Ralph A, 1991. "Solvency Regulation and the Property-Liability "Insurance Cycle."," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(3), pages 458-71, July.
  2. M. Martin Boyer, 2000. "Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(2), pages 159-178, December.
  3. Nell, Martin & Richter, Andreas & Schiller, Jörg, 2006. "When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 1187, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
  4. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-80, Part I, M.
  5. Frech, H E, III & Ginsburg, Paul B, 1975. "Imposed Health Insurance in Monopolistic Markets: A Theoretical Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(1), pages 55-70, March.
  6. Eric Smith & Randall Wright, 1991. "Why is automobile insurance in Philadelphia so damn expensive?," Staff Report 139, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  7. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Jörg Schiller, 2006. "The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(3), pages 421-438.
  9. Artis, Manuel & Ayuso, Mercedes & Guillen, Montserrat, 1999. "Modelling different types of automobile insurance fraud behaviour in the Spanish market," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 67-81, March.
  10. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2003. "Optimal Auditing for Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche 0329, CIRPEE.
  11. Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June.
  12. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1982. "Kinked utility and the demand for human wealth and liability insurance," Munich Reprints in Economics 19909, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  13. Cummins, J. David & Danzon, Patricia M., 1997. "Price, Financial Quality, and Capital Flows in Insurance Markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 3-38, January.
  14. Keith J. Crocker & John Morgan, 1998. "Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 355-375, April.
  15. Bond, E.W. & Crocker, K.J., 1993. "Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs," Papers 10-93-1b, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  16. Ching-to Albert Ma & Ingela Alger, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Insurance and Some Collusion," FMG Discussion Papers dp318, Financial Markets Group.
  17. Borenstein, Severin, 1989. "The economics of costly risk sorting in competitive insurance markets," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 25-39, June.
  18. Nahum Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997. "Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 257-289, 06.
  19. Lacker, J.M., 1989. "Optimal Contracts Under Costly State Falsification," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 956, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  20. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May.
  21. Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation And Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 8831, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  22. Winter Ralph A., 1994. "The Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 379-415, September.
  23. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
  24. Segal, Ilya, 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 57-82, January.
  25. Bond, Eric W & Crocker, Keith J, 1991. "Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting: The Endogenous Categorization of Risks in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 177-200, February.
  26. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
  27. Anne Gron, 1994. "Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property-Casualty Insurance Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 110-127, Spring.
  28. Alary, David & Besfamille, Martin, 2002. "Do insurance defrauders want to be punished ?," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6456, Paris Dauphine University.
  29. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-38, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:hzvwps:11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.