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Dynamics of Democratization and the Organization of Education

Author

Listed:
  • Machielsen, Bas
  • van Besouw, Bram

Abstract

We study the fiscal and educational consequences of franchise extension using the administratively arbitrary sorting of Dutch municipalities into nine voter-eligibility classes by the 1896 Electoral Law. Larger suffrage expansions contracted municipal expenditure and revenue and cut education spending, the largest budget heading. Public-school fees fell sharply while public pupils, schools, and class size did not change, so a smaller budget was spread over unchanged public provision and the saving passed to parents. Administrative records for 1905--1907 show that private pupil and teacher stocks expanded and the private share of teaching staff rose, while public stocks stood still inside a growing system. Neither a rise in the appeal of confessional schooling nor a fall in public teachers per pupil accounts for this. Teacher vacancy advertisements show private schools raising salaries while public councils increasingly rested on the statutory minimum. Democratization reorganized primary education rather than enlarging or shrinking it.

Suggested Citation

  • Machielsen, Bas & van Besouw, Bram, 2026. "Dynamics of Democratization and the Organization of Education," EconStor Preprints 342692, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:342692
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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