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Wettbewerb im deutschen Mobilfunkmarkt

Author

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  • Haucap, Justus
  • Heimeshoff, Ulrich
  • Stühmeier, Torben

Abstract

This paper studies competition in the German market for mobile telecommunications, motivated by recent suggestions that T-Mobile and Vodafone possess a position of collective dominance. Allegedly, their position of joint dominance is secured through a combination of first-mover advantages and discrimination between on-net and off-net prices. While our qualitative analysis remains inconclusive, as some factors tend to favour collusion while others make collusion more difficult to sustain, our empirical analysis suggests that T-Mobile and Vodafone cannot act independently of their smaller rivals, but that they are disciplined by their smaller competitors' offerings.

Suggested Citation

  • Haucap, Justus & Heimeshoff, Ulrich & Stühmeier, Torben, 2010. "Wettbewerb im deutschen Mobilfunkmarkt," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 04, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:diceop:04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paolo Lupi & Fabio M. Manenti, 2009. "Traffic Management In Wholesale International Roaming: Towards A More Efficient Market? ," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 379-407, October.
    2. Littlechild, S.C., 0. "Mobile termination charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(5-6), pages 242-277, June.
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    4. Wright, Julian, 2002. "Access Pricing under Competition: An Application to Cellular Networks," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 289-315, September.
    5. Christos Genakos & Tommaso Valletti, 2011. "Testing The “Waterbed” Effect In Mobile Telephony," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(6), pages 1114-1142, December.
    6. Clemente, Jesus & Montanes, Antonio & Reyes, Marcelo, 1998. "Testing for a unit root in variables with a double change in the mean," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 175-182, May.
    7. Daniel Birke & G. Swann, 2006. "Network effects and the choice of mobile phone operator," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 65-84, April.
    8. Patrice Geoffron & Haobo Wang, 2008. "What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 58-79.
    9. Lukasz Grzybowski, 2005. "Regulation of Mobile Telephony across the European Union: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 47-67, July.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/79 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Anja Lambrecht & Katja Seim & Bernd Skiera, 2007. "Does Uncertainty Matter? Consumer Behavior Under Three-Part Tariffs," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(5), pages 698-710, 09-10.
    12. Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl & Vagstad, Steinar, 2008. "Why is on-net traffic cheaper than off-net traffic Access markup as a collusive device," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 99-115, January.
    13. Bolle Friedel & Heimel Jana, 2005. "A Fallacy of Dominant Price Vectors in Network Industries," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(3), pages 1-8, September.
    14. Gruber,Harald, 2005. "The Economics of Mobile Telecommunications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521843270.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zucchini, Leon & Claussen, Jörg & Trüg, Moritz, 2013. "Tariff-mediated network effects versus strategic discounting: Evidence from German mobile telecommunications," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 751-759.
    2. repec:lmu:msmdpa:12688 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Coenen, Michael & Haucap, Justus, 2013. "Kommunal- statt Missbrauchsaufsicht: Zur Aufsicht über Trinkwasserentgelte nach der 8. GWB-Novelle," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 53, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    4. Muck, Johannes, 2012. "The Effect of On-net/Off-net Differentiation and Heterogeneous Consumers on Network Size in Mobile Telecommunications – An Agent-based Approach," 19th ITS Biennial Conference, Bangkok 2012: Moving Forward with Future Technologies - Opening a Platform for All 72477, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    5. Haucap, Justus, 2010. "Eingeschränkte Rationalität in der Wettbewerbsökonomie," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 08, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    6. Muck, Johannes, 2012. "The effect of on-net / off-net differentiation and heterogeneuous consumers on network size in mobile telecommunications : an agent-based aporoach," 23rd European Regional ITS Conference, Vienna 2012 60355, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    7. Muck, Johannes, 2016. "Tariff-mediated network effects with incompletely informed consumers," DICE Discussion Papers 210, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    8. repec:lmu:msmdpa:13764 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wettbewerb; Mobilfunk; Telekommunikation; kollektive Marktbeherrschung;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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