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IP-based NGNs and Interconnection: The Debate in Europe

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  • J. Scott MARCUS

    (WIK-Consult GmbH, Bad Honnef, Germany)

Abstract

Historically, interconnection in the world of the Internet has been approached significantly differently from interconnection in the fixed Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and the mobile Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN). As fixed and mobile networks evolve to Next Generation Networks (NGNs) based on the Internet Protocol (IP), it becomes increasingly necessary to merge these perspectives in order to achieve a unified and integrated approach to network interconnection. There is a rich history of economic analysis of IP-based and of conventional switched networks that began to converge early in this decade. In 2008, this issue is coming to a boil, as regulators seek to provide regulatory certainty for the build-out of NGNs, even in the face of substantial uncertainties, and even though practical experience with NGNs is still in a very preliminary state. What can we learn from the historical evolution of the theory of interconnection for Internet, NGN, PSTN and PLMN? What issues are "in play" today? What is the appropriate destination in the long term? What nearer term measures are appropriate?

Suggested Citation

  • J. Scott MARCUS, 2008. "IP-based NGNs and Interconnection: The Debate in Europe," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(72), pages 17-32, 4th quart.
    • Handle: RePEc:idt:journl:cs7201
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    interconnection; NGN; Internet Protocol (IP); bill and keep; Calling Party's Network Pays (CPNP); peering; transit.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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