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Barro-Gordon revisited: reputational equilibria in a New Keynesian model

  • Totzek, Alexander
  • Wohltmann, Hans-Werner

The aim of this paper is to solve the inconsistency problem à la Barro and Gordon within a New Keynesian model and to derive time-consistent (stable) interest rate rules of Taylor-type. We find a multiplicity of stable rules. In contrast to the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach, implementing a monetary rule where the cost and benefit resulting from inconsistent policy coincide - which implies a net gain of inconsistent policy behavior equal to zero - is not optimal. Instead, the solution can be improved by moving into the time-consistent area where the net gain of inconsistent policy is negative. We moreover show that under a standard calibration, the standard Taylor rule is stable in the case of a cost-push shock as well as under simultaneous supply and demand shocks.

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Paper provided by Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2010,04.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauewp:201004
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Web page: http://www.vwl.uni-kiel.de/en

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  1. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "Teaching Inflation Targeting: An Analysis for Intermediate Macro," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(4), pages 333-346, December.
  2. Kaushik Mitra & James Bullard, . "Learning About Monetary Policy Rules," Discussion Papers 00/41, Department of Economics, University of York.
  3. Bofinger, Peter & Mayer, Eric & Wollmershäuser, Timo, 2009. "Teaching New Keynesian Open Economy Macroeconomics at the Intermediate Level," Munich Reprints in Economics 20213, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule," Papers 646, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  5. Peter Bofinger & Eric Mayer & Timo Wollmersh�user, 2006. "The BMW Model: A New Framework for Teaching Monetary Economics," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(1), pages 98-117, January.
  6. Peter N. Ireland, 1998. "Does the Time-Consistency Problem Explain the Behavior of Inflation in the United States?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 415, Boston College Department of Economics.
  7. Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Open-Economy Inflation Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 1989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Clarida, Richard & Galí, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 2139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Yuki Teranishi, 2008. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Staggered Loan Contracts," IMES Discussion Paper Series 08-E-08, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  10. Francisco Javier Ruge-Murcia, 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," IMF Working Papers 01/161, International Monetary Fund.
  11. David Romer, 2000. "Keynesian Macroeconomics without the LM Curve," NBER Working Papers 7461, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Dennis, Richard, 2010. "When is discretion superior to timeless perspective policymaking?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 266-277, April.
  14. A. Robert Nobay & David A. Peel, 2003. "Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy in a Model of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 657-665, 07.
  15. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Teruyoshi Kobayashi, 2008. "Incomplete Interest Rate Pass-Through and Optimal Monetary Policy," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(3), pages 77-118, September.
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