IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/bubdps/142016.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How central is central counterparty clearing? A deep dive into a European repo market during the crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Ebner, André
  • Fecht, Falko
  • Schulz, Alexander

Abstract

Repo markets offering central counterparty (CCP) clearing and anonymized trading were remarkably resilient during the recent crises. We use the full transaction level dataset on all repo trades on Eurex Repo, including identifiers for market participants, to provide a detailed description of the market's development and microstructure during the crises and under different monetary policy interventions. Overall, we find high excess liquidity being associated with lower private liquidity provision in this market. Cross-segment arbitrage and market making is limited but growing steadily. The reallocation of liquidity risk across banks within this market varies substantially with the general market conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ebner, André & Fecht, Falko & Schulz, Alexander, 2016. "How central is central counterparty clearing? A deep dive into a European repo market during the crisis," Discussion Papers 14/2016, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:142016
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/142125/1/860791300.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin & Michael Walker, 2010. "The tri-party repo market before the 2010 reforms," Staff Reports 477, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    2. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012. "Securitized banking and the run on repo," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
    3. Peter G. Dunne & Michael J. Fleming & Andrey Zholos, 2013. "ECB monetary operations and the interbank repo market," Staff Reports 654, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Gara Afonso & Anna Kovner & Antoinette Schoar, 2011. "Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(4), pages 1109-1139, August.
    5. Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin & Michael Walker, 2014. "Repo Runs: Evidence from the Tri-Party Repo Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2343-2380, December.
    6. Loriano Mancini & Angelo Ranaldo & Jan Wrampelmeyer, 2016. "The Euro Interbank Repo Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(7), pages 1747-1779.
    7. Paul Agueci & Leyla Alkan & Adam Copeland & Isaac Davis & Antoine Martin & Kate Pingitore & Caroline Prugar & Tyisha Rivas, 2014. "A primer on the GCF Repo® Service," Staff Reports 671, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    8. Arvind Krishnamurthy & Stefan Nagel & Dmitry Orlov, 2014. "Sizing Up Repo," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2381-2417, December.
    9. Dunne, Peter & Fleming, Michael J. & Zholos, Andrey, 2011. "Repo Market Microstructure in Unusual Monetary Policy Conditions," Research Technical Papers 8/RT/11, Central Bank of Ireland.
    10. Peter Hördahl & Michael R King, 2008. "Developments in repo markets during the financial turmoil," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Darrell Duffie, 2018. "Financial Regulatory Reform After the Crisis: An Assessment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4835-4857, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boissel, Charles & Derrien, François & Ors, Evren & Thesmar, David, 2017. "Systemic risk in clearing houses: Evidence from the European repo market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 511-536.
    2. Mario Di Filippo & Angelo Ranaldo & Jan Wrampelmeyer, 2022. "Unsecured and Secured Funding," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(2-3), pages 651-662, March.
    3. Fuhrer, Lucas Marc, 2018. "Liquidity in the repo market," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 1-22.
    4. Julliard, Christian & Pinter, Gabor & Todorov, Karamfil & Yuan, Kathy, 2022. "What drives repo haircuts? Evidence from the UK market," Bank of England working papers 985, Bank of England.
    5. Christophe Pérignon & David Thesmar & Guillaume Vuillemey, 2018. "Wholesale Funding Dry‐Ups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 575-617, April.
    6. Bulusu, Narayan & Guérin, Pierre, 2019. "What drives interbank loans? Evidence from Canada," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 427-444.
    7. Buschmann, Christian & Schmaltz, Christian, 2017. "Sovereign collateral as a Trojan Horse: Why do we need an LCR+," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 311-330.
    8. Ranaldo, Angelo & Rupprecht, Matthias, 2016. "The Forward Premium in Short-Term Rates," Working Papers on Finance 1619, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Sep 2019.
    9. Viktoria Baklanova & Adam Copeland & Rebecca McCaughrin, 2015. "Reference guide to U.S. repo and securities lending markets," Staff Reports 740, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    10. Wolski, Marcin & van de Leur, Michiel, 2016. "Interbank loans, collateral and modern monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 388-416.
    11. van Horen, Neeltje & Kotidis, Antonios, 2018. "Repo market functioning: The role of capital regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 13090, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Nyborg, Kjell G., 2017. "Central bank collateral frameworks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 198-214.
    13. Corradin, Stefano & Heider, Florian & Hoerova, Marie, 2017. "On collateral: implications for financial stability and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2107, European Central Bank.
    14. Acharya, Viral V. & Fleming, Michael J. & Hrung, Warren B. & Sarkar, Asani, 2017. "Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 81-107.
    15. Hüser, Anne-Caroline & Lepore, Caterina & Veraart, Luitgard, 2021. "How does the repo market behave under stress? Evidence from the Covid-19 crisis," Bank of England working papers 910, Bank of England, revised 18 Jun 2021.
    16. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69.
    17. Corradin, Stefano & Maddaloni, Angela, 2020. "The importance of being special: Repo markets during the crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 392-429.
    18. Gerba, Eddie & Katsoulis, Petros, 2021. "The repo market under Basel III," Bank of England working papers 954, Bank of England.
    19. Piero Gottardi & Vincent Maurin & Cyril Monnet, 2019. "A theory of repurchase agreements, collateral re-use, and repo intermediation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 30-56, July.
    20. Alexander Bechtel & Angelo Ranaldo & Jan Wrampelmeyer, 2023. "Liquidity Risk and Funding Cost," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(2), pages 399-422.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    repo; central counterparty; market microstructure; financial crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:142016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dbbgvde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.