Work Disability, Health, and Incentive Effects
Disability insurance – the insurance against the loss of the ability to work – is a substantial part of social security expenditures in many countries. The enrolment rates in disability insurance vary strik-ingly across European countries and the US. This paper investigates the extent of, and the causes for, this variation, using data from SHARE, ELSA and HRS. We show that even after controlling for differences in the demographic structure and health status these differences remain. In turn, indicators of disability insurance generosity explain 75% of the cross-national variation. We conclude that country-specific disability insurance rules are a prime can-didate to explain the observed cross-country variation in disability insurance enrolment.
|Date of creation:||08 May 2007|
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- Sveinbjörn Blöndal & Stefano Scarpetta, 1999. "The Retirement Decision in OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 202, OECD Publishing.
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