Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: Micro-Estimation
This is the introduction to and summary of the second stage of a international research project to study the relationship between social security provisions and retirement. The project relies on the analyses of a large group of economists in 12 countries who conduct the analysis for each of their countries. In the first stage we documented the enormous disincentives for continued work at older ages in many countries. The introduction to the first volume from the project concluded with a striking graph showing a strong relationship across countries between social security program incentives to retire and the proportion of older persons out of the labor force. The results in this volume show the large magnitude of these effects. Across 12 countries with very different social security programs and labor market institutions, the results consistently show that program incentives accord strongly with retirement decisions. The magnitude is illustrated by the simulations reported in each country paper. Considering the average across all countries, a reform that delays benefit eligibility by three years would likely reduce the proportion of men 56 to 65 out of the labor force between 23 and 36 percent, perhaps closer to 36 percent in the long run. On the other hand, an illustrative common reform'-- with early retirement at age 60, normal retirement age 65, and actuarial reduction in benefits between 65 and 60--has very disparate effects across the countries, depending on the provisions of the current program in each country. There is a strong correspondence between the simulation results and a priori expectations. The results leave little doubt that social security incentives have a strong effect on retirement decisions. And the estimates show that the effect is similar in countries with very different cultural histories, labor market institutions, and other social characteristics. While countries may differ in many respects, the employees in all countries react similarly to
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|This book is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Books with number grub04-1 and published in 2004.|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Courtney Coile & Jonathan Gruber, 2001. "Social Security Incentives for Retirement," NBER Chapters,in: Themes in the Economics of Aging, pages 311-354 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James H. Stock & David A. Wise, 1990.
"The Pension Inducement to Retire: An Option Value Analysis,"
NBER Chapters,in: Issues in the Economics of Aging, pages 205-230
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James H. Stock & David A. Wise, 1988. "The Pension Inducement to Retire: An Option Value Analysis," NBER Working Papers 2660, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward P. Lazear, 1983. "Pensions as Severance Pay," NBER Chapters,in: Financial Aspects of the United States Pension System, pages 57-90 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laurence J. Kotlikoff & David A. Wise, 1985.
"Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans: Evidence for Contractual versus Spot Labor Markets,"
NBER Chapters,in: Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice, pages 55-88
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laurence J. Kotlikoff & David A. Wise, 1984. "Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans: Evidence for Contractual Versus Spot Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 1290, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zvi Bodie & John B. Shoven, 1983. "Financial Aspects of the United States Pension System," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bodi83-1, December.
- Stock, James H & Wise, David A, 1990.
"Pensions, the Option Value of Work, and Retirement,"
Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1151-1180, September.
- James H. Stock & David A. Wise, 1988. "Pensions, The Option Value of Work, and Retirement," NBER Working Papers 2686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gruber, Jonathan & Wise, David A. (ed.), 1999. "Social Security and Retirement around the World," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226310114. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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