Evaluating Pension Policies in a Model with Endogeous Contributions
A model of the firm and its pension plan is used to simulate the first round effects of pension policies. Pension policies create an imbalance in the pension fund which affects the level of pension contributions and ultimately wages. Changes in the differential between compensation and productivity for individual workers alter the distributions of compensation and of incentives for retirement, mobility and effort. Policies investigated include those regulating vesting, pension calculations for early leavers, early retirees and late retirees, maximum service credits, liabilities at termination, and funding practices.
|Date of creation:||Aug 1989|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Pension Incentives and Job Mobility. Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institutefor Employment Research, 1995.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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