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The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Schmidt, Carsten

    () (Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim)

  • Zultan, Ro´i

    () (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality and School of Education)

Abstract

The experiment disentangles communication and social effect in face−to−face communication. The results question the previous interpretation of communication effects in ultimatum bargaining, and suggest that separate processes, both of a strategic and of an affective−social nature induce cooperative outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidt, Carsten & Zultan, Ro´i, 2005. "The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis Revisited," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-29, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    • Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:05-29
    Note: We thank Werner Güth, Yaakov Kareev, Axel Ockenfels, and the participants of the European ESA meeting 2003 in Erfurt for
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Werner Güth & Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter, 2003. "Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet: A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(2), pages 243-265, May.
    2. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    3. Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ben Greiner & Werner Güth & Ro’i Zultan, 2012. "Social communication and discrimination: a video experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(3), pages 398-417, September.
    2. Greiner, Ben & Caravella, Mary & Roth, Alvin E., 2014. "Is avatar-to-avatar communication as effective as face-to-face communication? An Ultimatum Game experiment in First and Second Life," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 374-382.
    3. Qiyan ONG & Yohanes Eko RIYANTO & Walter E. THESEIRA & Steven M. SHEFFRIN, 2013. "The Self-Image Signaling Roles of Voice in Decision-Making," Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series 1303, Nanyang Technological University, School of Social Sciences, Economic Growth Centre.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00033 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Barmettler, Franziska & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian, 2012. "Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 17-34.
    6. Ben Greiner & Werner Güth & Ro'i Zultan, 2005. "Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments -," Working Paper Series in Economics 18, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    7. Tim Lohse & Salmai Qari, 2018. "Video Recordings in Experiments – Are There Effects on Self-Selection or the Outcome of the Experiment?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1751, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    8. Zultan, Ro’i, 2012. "Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 425-434.
    9. Brosig, Jeannette, 2006. "Communication channels and induced behavior," MPRA Paper 14035, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Björn Frank, 2009. "Clean Evidence on Face-to-Face: Why Experimental Economics is of Interest to Regional Economists," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200904, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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