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Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment

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  • Carsten Schmidt
  • Ro`i Zultan

Abstract

It is commonly accepted that face-to-face communication induces cooperation. The experiment disentangles communication and social effect (replication of Roth, 1995) and examines the components of the social effect with the help of unilateral communication. Results suggest that separate processes, both of a strategic and of an affective-social nature may induce cooperative outcomes in ultimatum bargaining with pre-play communication, depending on the communication protocol. Unilateral communication is found to have weaker effects than bilateral communication, and affects especially the recipient of the communication.

Suggested Citation

  • Carsten Schmidt & Ro`i Zultan, 2004. "Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment," Discussion Paper Series dp369, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp369
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Werner Güth & Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter, 2003. "Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet: A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(2), pages 243-265, May.
    2. Frohlich, Norman & Oppenheimer, Joe, 1998. "Some consequences of e-mail vs. face-to-face communication in experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 389-403, April.
    3. Jeannette Brosig & Axel Ockenfels & Joachim Weimann, 2003. "Information and Communication in Sequential Bargaining," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-09, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    4. Hoffman, Elizabeth & Spitzer, Matthew L, 1982. "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 73-98, April.
    5. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    6. Radner, Roy & Schotter, Andrew, 1989. "The sealed-bid mechanism: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 179-220, June.
    7. Thomas Baumann & Carsten Schmidt, 2004. "The Jena video laboratory for economic experiments," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    8. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brosig, Jeannette, 2006. "Communication channels and induced behavior," MPRA Paper 14035, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Thomas Baumann & Carsten Schmidt, 2004. "The Jena video laboratory for economic experiments," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    one way communication; pre-play communication; bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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