Bargaining and Negotiations What should experimentalists explore more thoroughly?
A long time ago most economists would have limited themselves to stating that agreements should be individually rational and efficient and that selecting a specific agreement from that set depends on bargaining and negotiation power whatever that may be. Nowadays hardly any economist will argue that way. The change has been brought about by the strategic approach to bargaining and cooperation and the parallel experimental studies of bargaining and negotiation. When arguing what should be explored more thoroughly, we will point out directions where previous efforts may have been misdirected, where importing new methods may be helpful or even needed, and where new research questions need to be asked and answered.
|Date of creation:||07 Mar 2011|
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- Güth, Werner & Schmidt, Carsten & Sutter, Matthias, 2001.
"Fairness in the mail and opportunism in the internet: A newspaper experiment on ultimatum bargaining,"
SFB 373 Discussion Papers
2001,42, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Werner Güth & Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter, 2003. "Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet: A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(2), pages 243-265, 05.
- Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter & Werner Guth, 2003. "Fairness in the mail and opportunism in the internet - a newspaper experiment on ultimatum bargaining," Artefactual Field Experiments 00051, The Field Experiments Website.
- Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter & Werner Güth, 2005.
"Bargaining Outside the Lab - A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2006-04, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Werner Güth & Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter, 2007. "Bargaining outside the lab - a newspaper experiment of a three-person ultimatum game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 449-469, 03.
- Werner Güth & Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter, 2005. "Bargaining Outside the Lab – A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-11, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter & Werner Guth, 2002. "Bargaining outside the lab - a newspaper experiment of a three person-ultimatum game," Artefactual Field Experiments 00050, The Field Experiments Website.
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
- Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth & Ulrich Kamecke, 2012. "Finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments without a commonly known end," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 23-47, February.
- Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler & Agnes Stribeck, 2010.
"Equity versus Efficiency? - Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments -,"
Jena Economic Research Papers
2010-018, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Werner GÃ¼th & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler & Agnes Stribeck, 2010. "Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(2), pages 89-102, April.
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