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Competition for status acquisition in public good games

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  • Felix Munoz-Garcia

    (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University)

Abstract

This paper examines the role of status acquisition as a motive for giving in voluntary contri- butions to public goods. In particular, every donor's status is given by the difference between his contribution and that of the other donor. Specifically, I show that contributors give more than in standard models where status is not considered, and their donation is increasing in the value they assign to status. In addition, players'contributions are increasing in the value that their opponents assign to status, reflecting donors' intense competition to gain social status. Furthermore, I consider contributors'equilibrium strategies both in simultaneous and sequen- tial contribution mechanisms. Then, I compare total contributions in both of these mechanisms. I find that the simultaneous contribution order generates higher total contributions than the sequential mechanism only when donors are sufficiently homogeneous in the value they assign to status. Otherwise, the sequential mechanism generates the highest contributions. Updated 6-03-09.

Suggested Citation

  • Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2008. "Competition for status acquisition in public good games," Working Papers 2008-12, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-2
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    File URL: http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/WorkingPapers/Munoz/Competition-Status-acquisition.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin & Vesterlund, Lise, 2005. "After you--endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1399-1419, August.
    2. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1085-1107, September.
    3. Ball, Sheryl & Eckel, Catherine C., 1998. "The economic value of status," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 495-514.
    4. Congleton, Roger D., 1989. "Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 175-190, March.
    5. John Duffy & Tatiana Kornienko, 2005. "Does Competition Affect Giving? An Experimental Study," Experimental 0508002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. repec:pit:wpaper:266 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2001. "Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 423-447, September.
    8. Sheryl Ball & Catherine Eckel & Philip J. Grossman & William Zame, 2001. "Status in Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(1), pages 161-188.
    9. John Morgan, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 761-784.
    10. Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

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    2. Kanjilal, Kiriti, 2017. "Consumption of Common Pool Resources under Altruism and Uncertainty," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258332, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Dora E. Bock & Jacqueline K. Eastman & Kevin L. Eastman, 2018. "Encouraging Consumer Charitable Behavior: The Impact of Charitable Motivations, Gratitude, and Materialism," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 150(4), pages 1213-1228, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods games; Status acquisition; Competition.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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