Fiscal competition in a transition economy
The paper analyses fiscal competition for mobile capital between identical regions in a transition country. A framework similar to Keen- Marchand (1997) is used to analyse welfare effects of regional competition. It is shown that in very early transition when the share of the old sector is overwhelming, consumers in a transition economy may be better off in a competitive equilibrium. The decision-makers, however, would prefere to coordinate their fiscal policies.
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