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The vicious circles of control - regional governments and insiders in privatized Russian enterprises

Author

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  • Desai, Raj M.
  • Goldberg, Itzhak

Abstract

How can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the veryfirms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? The authors suggest that such asset-stripping and failure to restructure are the consequences of interactions between insiders (manager-owners) and regional governments in a particular property rights regime. In this regime, the ability to realize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity, so managers have little incentive to increase value. As the central institutions that rule Russia have ceded their powers to the regions, regional governments have imposed various distortions on enterprises to protect local employment. Prospective outsider-investors doubt they can acquire the control rights they need for restructuring firms and doubt they can avoid the distortions regional governments impose on the firms in which they might invest. The result: little restructuring and little new investment. And regional governments, knowing the firms'taxable cash flows will have been reduced through cash flow diversion, have responded by collecting revenues in kind. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, the authors propose a pilot for transforming ownership in insider-dominated firms through a system of simultaneous tax-debt-for-equity conversion and resale through competitive auctions. The objective: to show regional governments, for example, that a more sustainable way to protect employment is to give managers incentives to increase enterprises'value by transferring effective control to investors. The proposed mechanism would provide cash benefits to insiders who agree to sell control to outside investors. The increased cash revenue (rather than in-kind or money surrogates) would enable regional governments to finance safety nets for the unemployed and to promote other regional initiatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Desai, Raj M. & Goldberg, Itzhak, 2000. "The vicious circles of control - regional governments and insiders in privatized Russian enterprises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2287, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2287
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Irina Denisova & Stanislav Kolenikov & Ksenia Yudaeva, 2000. "Child Benefits and Child Poverty," Working Papers w0006, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    2. Kornai, János, 2000. "Tíz évvel a Röpirat angol kiadásának megjelenése után. A szerző önértékelése [Ten years after the English edition of `The Road to a Free Economy'. The author's self-evaluation]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 647-661.
    3. Janos Kornai, 2001. "Ten Years after “The Road to a Free Economy”: Self-estimate of the Author," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 42-60.
    4. Andreas Heinrich & Aleksandra Lis & Heiko Pleines, 2007. "Factors Influencing Corporate Governance in post-Socialist Companies: an Analytical Framework," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp896, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    5. Alexandra Reppegather & Manuela Troschke, 2006. "Graduelle Transformation von Wirtschaftsordnungen: Ein Vergleich der Reformstrategien Chinas und Usbekistans," Working Papers 260, Leibniz Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and Southeast European Studies).
    6. Zakolyukina Anastasia, 2006. "Bankrtuptcy in Russia: External Management Performance," EERC Working Paper Series 06-09e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    7. Laura Solanko, 2002. "Fiscal competition in a transition economy," Public Economics 0209002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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