Corporate Governance Rating and Family Firms: The Greek Case
Corporate governance (CG) studies have mostly focused on highly dispersed corporations. However, there is an important need for research exploring the governance structure of family-owned firms. The main characteristics that distinguish the family firm from the other types of corporations are the presence of one or more controlling family and the involvement of the owners in the management. Family firm is the most common form of business in Greece. Hence, the governance structures and the performance of the family firms affect the growth opportunities of the capital market. The aim of the paper is to explore the main aspects of CG of family-owned listed companies in Greece. For this purpose, we apply a specific CG rating methodology, using five core CG criteria to distinguish family from non-family firms: shareholders' rights and obligations; transparency, disclosure of information and auditing; board of directors; CEO and executive management and corporate social responsibility and corporate governance commitment. The overall research objective of the study is to develop a CG rating methodology on the current state of corporate governance in Greece. Each firm is rated among the 120 total number of companies (both family-owned and widely- held). The results disclose the potential strengths and weaknesses of the existing corporate governance framework of the family-owned firms and provide specific policy recommendations.
|Date of creation:||10 Mar 2005|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; pages: 17. The authors are grateful to participants at the 2004 Family Firms and Corporate Governance Conference (Istanbul) for helpful comments and discussions. Loukas Spanos acknowledges financial support from the General Secretary of Research & Technology in Greece and the European Union.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998.
"Law and Finance,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, "undated". "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,"
3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- De Paola, Maria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2005. "The Role of Family Ties in the Labour Market. An Interpretation Based on Efficiency Wage Theory," MPRA Paper 8956, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998.
"Corporate Ownership Around the World,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Chad Leechor, 1999. "Protecting Minority Shareholders in Closely Held Firms," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11471, The World Bank.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0503011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.