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Invariance failure under subgame perfectness in sequential bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Rami Zwick

    (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

  • Eythan Weg

    (Indiana University)

  • Amnon Rapoport

    (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

Abstract

A basic property of any normative theory of decision making --- individual or group --- is its invariance under the theory's own equivalence specification. Growing evidence from experimental studies in several areas of game playing indicates that the game-theoretic notion of strategic equivalence is systematically violated in the behavioral arena. The present study expands the design of previous studies of bilateral bargaining by including a third party and a new trading rule - -- modifications which induce behavioral patterns that reject equivalence under subgame perfection

Suggested Citation

  • Rami Zwick & Eythan Weg & Amnon Rapoport, 1999. "Invariance failure under subgame perfectness in sequential bargaining," Experimental 9903002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:9903002
    Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 42 ; figures: included
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport & Alison King Chung Lo & A. V. Muthukrishnan, 2003. "Consumer Sequential Search: Not Enough or Too Much?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(4), pages 503-519, October.
    2. Parco, James E. & Murphy, Ryan O., 2013. "Resistance to truthful revelation in bargaining: Persistent bid shading and the play of dominated strategies," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 154-170.
    3. Jiwoong Shin & Dan Ariely, 2004. "Keeping Doors Open: The Effect of Unavailability on Incentives to Keep Options Viable," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(5), pages 575-586, May.
    4. Bryan C. McCannon & John Stevens, 2017. "Role of personality style on bargaining outcomes," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 44(9), pages 1166-1196, September.
    5. Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport & Alison King Chung Lo & A. V. Muthukrishnan, 2001. "Consumer Search: Not Enough Or Too Much?," Experimental 0110002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; subgame perfect; invariance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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