IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wip/wpaper/22.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Trademarks Squatters: Evidence from Chile

Author

Listed:
  • Carsten Fink

    (Economics and Statistics Division, World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.)

  • Christian Helmers

    (Santa Clara University, United States of America)

  • Carlos Ponce

    (ILADES-Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago de Chile, Chile)

Abstract

This paper explores the phenomenon of 'trademark squatting' – a situation in which someone other than the original brand owner obtains a trademark on a brand. We develop a model that shows how squatting results from market uncertainty that leads brand owners to rationally forgo registering trademarks, creating opportunities for squatting. We create an algorithm to identify squatters in the Chilean trademark register and show empirically that squatting is a persistent and systematic phenomenon. Using data on trademark oppositions, we find that squatting leads brand owners that have been exposed to squatting to 'over-protect' their brands by registering disproportionately many trademarks and covering classes other than those directly related to their products and services. Trademark squatting, therefore, creates a strategic, albeit excessive, response by brand owners which inflates trademark filings.

Suggested Citation

  • Carsten Fink & Christian Helmers & Carlos Ponce, 2014. "Trademarks Squatters: Evidence from Chile," WIPO Economic Research Working Papers 22, World Intellectual Property Organization - Economics and Statistics Division.
    • Handle: RePEc:wip:wpaper:22
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_econstat_wp_22.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lynne M. Pepall, 2002. "The Simple Economics of Brand Stretching," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75(3), pages 535-552, July.
    2. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1987. "Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 265-309, October.
    3. Luis M.B. Cabral, 2000. "Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 658-673, Winter.
    4. Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
    5. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    6. Jaffe, Adam B, 1986. "Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms' Patents, Profits, and Market Value," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 984-1001, December.
    7. Boldrin,Michele & Levine,David K., 2010. "Against Intellectual Monopoly," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521127264.
    8. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    9. Birger Wernerfelt, 1988. "Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 458-466, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nasirov, Shukhrat, 2020. "Trademark value indicators: Evidence from the trademark protection lifecycle in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(4).
    2. Sandner, Philipp G. & Block, Joern, 2011. "The market value of R&D, patents, and trademarks," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 969-985, September.
    3. Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2012. "Linking reputations through umbrella branding," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 335-374, September.
    4. Sridhar Moorthy, 2012. "Can Brand Extension Signal Product Quality?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 756-770, September.
    5. Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2008. "Umbrella branding and the provision of quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 546-556, March.
    6. Miklos-Thal, Jeanine, 2008. "Linking Reputations: The Signaling and Feedback Effects of Umbrella Branding," MPRA Paper 11045, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Luigi Luini & Andrea Mangani, 2004. "Trademarks, Product Variety, and Economic Activity in Italy and Europe," Department of Economics University of Siena 422, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    8. Carl Benedikt Frey & Atif Ansar & Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, 2014. "Defining and measuring the 'Market for Brands': Are emerging economies catching up?," WIPO Economic Research Working Papers 21, World Intellectual Property Organization - Economics and Statistics Division.
    9. Giovanni B. Ramello, 2006. "What'S In A Sign ? Trademark Law And Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 547-565, September.
    10. Fink, Carsten & Helmers, Christian & Ponce, Carlos J., 2018. "Trademark squatters: Theory and evidence from Chile," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 340-371.
    11. Cabral, Luís M.B., 2009. "Umbrella branding with imperfect observability and moral hazard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 206-213, March.
    12. T. Tony Ke & Jiwoong Shin & Jungju Yu, 2023. "A Model of Product Portfolio Design: Guiding Consumer Search Through Brand Positioning," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(6), pages 1101-1124, November.
    13. Jungju Yu, 2021. "A Model of Brand Architecture Choice: A House of Brands vs. A Branded House," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(1), pages 147-167, January.
    14. Thomas Liebi, 2002. "Monitoring Eco-Labels: You Can Have Too Much of a Good Thing," Diskussionsschriften dp0207, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    15. Takako Fujiwara‐Greve & Henrich R. Greve & Stefan Jonsson, 2016. "Asymmetry Of Customer Loss And Recovery Under Endogenous Partnerships: Theory And Evidence," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 3-30, February.
    16. Lee, Kyeong Hun & Mauer, David C. & Xu, Emma Qianying, 2018. "Human capital relatedness and mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 111-135.
    17. Gurneeta Vasudeva & Jennifer W. Spencer & Hildy J. Teegen, 2013. "Bringing the Institutional Context Back In: A Cross-National Comparison of Alliance Partner Selection and Knowledge Acquisition," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(2), pages 319-338, April.
    18. E. Bacchiega & M. Colucci & M. Magnani, 2019. "What goes around, comes around: Reciprocal effects and double-sided moral hazard in the choice of brand licensing," Working Papers wp1136, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    19. Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Péreau, 2017. "Multilateral versus sequential negotiations over climate change," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 365-387.
    20. Eric B. Rasmusen, 2016. "Leveraging of Reputation through Umbrella Branding: The Implications for Market Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 261-273, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    trademark; squatter; strategic behavior; Chile.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • M30 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - General
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wip:wpaper:22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Economics and Statistics Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ewipoch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.