Monitoring Eco-Labels: You Can Have Too Much of a Good Thing
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Keywordscredence goods; labels; monitoring; product quality;
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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