IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Monitoring Eco-Labels: You Can Have Too Much of a Good Thing

  • Thomas Liebi
Registered author(s):

    An increasing number of product labels is making environmental claims. Typically, these claims are non-verifiable to consumers, they represent a credence attribute of the product. The usual way to handle this problem is external monitoring of such labels. We consider a model where firms in a competitive market choose product quality and the intensity of monitoring. It is shown that all the firms producing the high quality credence good will choose the same level of monitoring, i.e., an industry standard will evolve. However, in a competitive equilibrium there will be more monitoring than is socially desirable.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number dp0207.

    in new window

    Date of creation: Jul 2002
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0207
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Schanzeneckstr. 1, PF 8573, CH-3001 Bern
    Phone: 0041 31 631 45 06
    Fax: 41 31 631 37 83
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Pil Choi, J., 1997. "Brand Extension as Informational Leverage," ISER Discussion Paper 0451, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Thomas Liebi, 2002. "Trusting Labels: A Matter of Numbers?," Diskussionsschriften dp0201, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    3. Luis Cabral, 2000. "Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation," Working Papers 00-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    4. Emons, Winand, 2001. "Credence goods monopolists," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 375-389, March.
    5. Winand Emons, 1997. "Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
    6. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
    7. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    8. Andersson, Fredrik, 2002. "Pooling reputations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 715-730, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0207. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Silvia Glusstein-Gerber)

    The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Silvia Glusstein-Gerber to update the entry or send us the correct address

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.