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Rationalizing the Bias in Central Banks' Interest Rate Projections

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Frenkel
  • Jin-Kyu Jung
  • Jan-Christoph Rülke

    ()

Abstract

In this paper, we study the bias in interest rate projections for four central banks, namely for Czech Republic, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden. We examine whether central bank projections are based on an asymmetric loss function and report evidence that central banks perceive an overprojection of their longer-term interest rate forecasts as twice as costly as an underprojection of the same size. We document that rationality is consistent with biased interest rate projections which contribute to explaining the central banks’ behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Frenkel & Jin-Kyu Jung & Jan-Christoph Rülke, 2017. "Rationalizing the Bias in Central Banks' Interest Rate Projections," WHU Working Paper Series - Economics Group 17-03, WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:whu:wpaper:17-03
    as

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    File URL: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:992-opus4-4041
    File Function: First version, 2017
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Frenkel & Jan‐C. Rülke & Lilli Zimmermann, 2012. "Do Current Account Forecasters Herd? Evidence from the Euro Area and the G7 Countries," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 221-236, May.
    2. Gunda-Alexandra Detmers & Dieter Nautz, 2012. "The Information Content of Central Bank Interest Rate Projections: Evidence from New Zealand," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(282), pages 323-329, September.
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    7. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Laeven, Luc & Marquez, Robert, 2010. "Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk-Taking," Working Papers 11-05, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    8. Fritsche, Ulrich & Pierdzioch, Christian & Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Stadtmann, Georg, 2015. "Forecasting the Brazilian real and the Mexican peso: Asymmetric loss, forecast rationality, and forecaster herding," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 130-139.
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    10. Glenn D. Rudebusch & John C. Williams, 2008. "Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections," NBER Chapters,in: Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, pages 247-289 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Pierdzioch, Christian & Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Stadtmann, Georg, 2015. "Central banks’ inflation forecasts under asymmetric loss: Evidence from four Latin-American countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 66-70.
    12. Frenkel, Michael & Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Zimmermann, Lilli, 2013. "Do private sector forecasters chase after IMF or OECD forecasts?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 217-229.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Interest rate forecasts; Central bank communication; Asymmetric loss;

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E47 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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