IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Tenuous Financial Stability

  • Neven T. Valev

    ()

  • John A. Carlson

    ()

Many countries fix their exchange rate in order to bring financial stability. Usually, inflation declines and output expands but contractual agreements retain their short time frame, investment is sluggish, and economic growth slows down a few years later. This outcome is often attributed to persistent doubts on the part of agents in the commitment and ability of the government to maintain the peg. Yet direct evidence for credibility is difficult to obtain. Unique survey data from Bulgaria reveal that expectations of devaluation were indeed very much present three, four, and five years after that country achieved financial stability under a currency board regime.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp540.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number 540.

as
in new window

Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-540
Contact details of provider: Postal: 724 E. University Ave, Wyly Hall 1st Flr, Ann Arbor MI 48109
Phone: 734 763-5020
Fax: 734 763-5850
Web page: http://www.wdi.umich.edu
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Schmukler, Sergio L. & Serven, Luis, 2002. "Pricing currency risk : facts and puzzles from currency boards," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2815, The World Bank.
  2. Blanchard, Olivier & Kremer, Michael R., 1997. "Disorganization," Scholarly Articles 3659691, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Jan Svejnar, 2002. "Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
  4. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carlos A. Végh, 1994. "Inflation Stabilization And Nominal Anchors," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(2), pages 35-45, 04.
  5. Calvo, Guillermo A. & Drazen, Allan, 1998. "Uncertain Duration Of Reform," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(04), pages 443-455, December.
  6. repec:cup:macdyn:v:2:y:1998:i:4:p:443-55 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Allan Drazen & Paul R. Masson, 1993. "Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers," NBER Working Papers 4448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. John Williamson, 1995. "What Role of Currency Boards?," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number pa40.
  9. Mehlum, Halvor, 2001. "Capital accumulation, unemployment, and self-fulfilling failure of economic reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 291-306, August.
  10. Erik Berglof & Patrick Bolton, 2002. "The Great Divide and Beyond: Financial Architecture in Transition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 77-100, Winter.
  11. Schwartz, Anna J., 1993. "Currency boards: their past, present, and possible future role," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 147-187, December.
  12. G�rard Roland, 2002. "The Political Economy of Transition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 29-50, Winter.
  13. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Leonardo Leiderman, 1996. "High real interest rates in the aftermath of disinflation: is it a lack of credibility?," International Finance Discussion Papers 543, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  14. Wyplosz, Charles, 2000. "Ten years of transformation - macroeconomic lessons," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2288, The World Bank.
  15. Enrique G. Mendoza & Martin Uribe, 1999. "Devaluation Risk and the Syndrome of Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilizations," NBER Working Papers 7014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Guillermo A. Calvo & Allan Drazen, 1997. "Uncertain Duration of Reform: Dynamic Implications," NBER Working Papers 5925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Dobrinsky, Rumen, 2000. "The Transition Crisis in Bulgaria," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(5), pages 581-602, September.
  18. Richard W. Kopcke, 1999. "Currency boards: once and future monetary regimes?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue May, pages 21-37.
  19. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1986. "Temporary Stabilization: Predetermined Exchange Rates," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1319-29, December.
  20. Brock, Philip L. & Rojas Suarez, Liliana, 2000. "Understanding the behavior of bank spreads in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 113-134, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-540. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Laurie Gendron)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.