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Tenuous Financial Stability


  • Neven T. Valev


  • John A. Carlson



Many countries fix their exchange rate in order to bring financial stability. Usually, inflation declines and output expands but contractual agreements retain their short time frame, investment is sluggish, and economic growth slows down a few years later. This outcome is often attributed to persistent doubts on the part of agents in the commitment and ability of the government to maintain the peg. Yet direct evidence for credibility is difficult to obtain. Unique survey data from Bulgaria reveal that expectations of devaluation were indeed very much present three, four, and five years after that country achieved financial stability under a currency board regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Neven T. Valev & John A. Carlson, 2003. "Tenuous Financial Stability," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 540, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-540

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Richard W. Kopcke, 1999. "Currency boards: once and future monetary regimes?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue May, pages 21-37.
    2. Kaminsky, Graciela L. & Leiderman, Leonardo, 1998. "High real interest rates in the aftermath of disinflation: is it a lack of credibility?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 191-214, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dimitar Dimitrov & Rumen Dobrinsky & Nasko Dochev & Rumyana Kolarova & Nikolay Markov & Boyko Nikolov, 2004. "Understanding Reform: A Country Study for Bulgaria," wiiw Balkan Observatory Working Papers 56, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw.

    More about this item


    Credibility; Currency boards; Stabilization programs;

    JEL classification:

    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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