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Incentive Contracting versus Ownership Reforms: Evidence from China's Township and Village Enterprises

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  • Chun Chang Yijiang Wang
  • Brian McCall
  • Yijiang Wang

Abstract

We use a unique data set to study the implications of introducing managerial incentives and, in addition to incentives, better defined ownership for a firm's financial performance. The data set traces the ten-year history of 80 Chinese rural enterprises, known as township and village enterprises. During this period, these originally (mostly) community owned, local government controlled socialist collective firms were first allowed to introduce managerial incentive contracts and then to change to ownership forms of more clearly defined income and control rights. The study finds that introducing managerial incentives had a positive but statistically insignificant effect on these firms' performance measured by accounting return on assets or return on equity. It also finds that the performance is significantly better under ownership forms of better-defined rights than under community ownership even when the latter is supplemented with managerial incentive contracts. The findings shed lights on some important theoretical and policy issues. Classification-JEL:

Suggested Citation

  • Chun Chang Yijiang Wang & Brian McCall & Yijiang Wang, 2000. "Incentive Contracting versus Ownership Reforms: Evidence from China's Township and Village Enterprises," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 365, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2001-365
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    Cited by:

    1. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 945-983, July.
    2. Pradeep Kautish, 2010. "Study On Impact Of Environmental Change On Selected Public Sector Enterprises In India," Romanian Economic Business Review, Romanian-American University, vol. 5(2), pages 68-88, June.
    3. Mugisha, Silver, 2007. "Effects of incentive applications on technical efficiencies: Empirical evidence from Ugandan water utilities," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 225-233, December.
    4. Ito, Junichi, 2006. "Economic and institutional reform packages and their impact on productivity: A case study of Chinese township and village enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 167-190, March.
    5. Zhang, Anming & Zhang, Yimin & Zhao, Ronald, 2002. "Profitability and productivity of Chinese industrial firms: Measurement and ownership implications," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 65-88.
    6. Zhan, Shaohua, 2015. "From Privatization to Deindustrialization: Implications of Chinese Rural Industry and the Ownership Debate Revisited," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 108-122.
    7. Takao Kato & Cheryl Long, 2004. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and State Ownership in China: Evidence from New Panel Data," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-690, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    8. Fleisher, Belton M. & Wang, Xiaojun, 2003. "Potential residual and relative wages in Chinese township and village enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 429-443, September.
    9. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from New Micro Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1914, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Michael Webber, 2012. "Making Capitalism in Rural China," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14446.
    11. Xincai Gao & Zhongyang Ji & Fayyaz Ahmad & Muhammad Umar Draz, 2019. "Financial Support and Growth of Township and Village Enterprises in China: Fresh Evidence From Regional Analyses," SAGE Open, , vol. 9(2), pages 21582440198, June.
    12. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 796-817, December.
    13. Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2010. "The Institutional Foundations of China’s Reforms and Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 7654, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Dong, Xiao-yuan & Putterman, Louis & Unel, Bulent, 2006. "Privatization and firm performance: A comparison between rural and urban enterprises in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 608-633, September.
    15. Sangeetha Gunasekar & Jayati Sarkar, 2014. "Does autonomy matter in state owned enterprises? Evidence from performance contracts in India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2014-034, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    16. Zheng, Lucy & Batuo, Michael Enowbi & Shepherd, David, 2017. "The Impact of Regional and Institutional Factors on Labor Productive Performance—Evidence from the Township and Village Enterprise Sector in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 591-598.
    17. Sandeep Mohapatra & Rachael Goodhue & Scott Rozelle, 2008. "Incentive Complementarity in China’s Rural Enterprises," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 33(1), pages 63-79, August.

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