Heterogeneity, distribution, and cooperation in common property resource management
The report considers the role of group heterogeneity in the success or failure of common property resource management. The author argues that cooperative agreements are less likely to come about when agents are highly heterogeneous along relevant dimensions - and existing agreements are more likely to break down as a group becomes more heterogeneous. The author crystallizes his argument in simple numerical examples and illustrates by reference to case studies on common property resource management, in particular, cases involving fisheries and irrigation systems. More work is needed to substantiate the author's argument, but his analysis so far supports the argument that equity and efficiency complement rather than oppose each other.
|Date of creation:||31 Jan 1992|
|Date of revision:|
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- Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-22, December.
- Migot-Adholla, Shem, et al, 1991. "Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 5(1), pages 155-75, January.
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