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Governance and economic growth

  • Gradstein, Mark
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    Because protection of property rights cannot be appropriated by any individual, it is widely recognized as being the state's responsibility. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that protection of property rights leads to higher investment levels and faster growth. The extent of property rights protection differs significantly across countries. The author integrates the emergence of property rights within a simple growth framework. Drawing on North (1990), he presents a model where economic performance and enforcement of property rights may reinforce each other.Initial conditions determine the economy's convergence to a high-income or a low-income steady state. Existing empirical evidence offers tentative support for this theory.

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    Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3098.

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    Date of creation: 31 Jul 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3098
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    1. Lane, Philip R & Tornell, Aaron, 1996. " Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 213-41, June.
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    7. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1997. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," NBER Working Papers 6009, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Gradstein, Mark, 2002. "Rules, stability, and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 471-484, April.
    9. Svensson, Jakob, 1998. "Investment, property rights and political instability: Theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1317-1341, July.
    10. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    13. Paul Zak, . "Institutions, Property Rights, and Growth," Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics, and Evolutionary Biology 2-1-1009, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    14. Paul J. ZAK, 2002. "Institutions, Property Rights and Growth," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2002014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
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    17. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1999. "Governance matters," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2196, The World Bank.
    18. Paul J. Zak, 2002. "Institutions, Property Rights, and Growth," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 68(1), pages 55-73.
    19. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
    20. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
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