IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2245.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Opportunities for improving environmental compliance in Mexico

Author

Listed:
  • Dasgupta, Susmita

Abstract

Survey evidence from Mexico reveals large observed differences in pollution from factories in the same industry, or the same area, or operating under the same regulatory regime. Many factories have adopted significant measures for pollution control and are in compliance with environmental regulations, but some have made little or no such effort. For lack of data, systematic research on the reasons behind such variations in plant-level environmental performance (especially on how impediments to pollution control affect plant behavior) is rare, even in industrial societies. Drawing on a recent plant-level survey of Mexican factories, the author identifies a number of performance variables characteristic of compliant and non-compliant plants, as well as factors that no-compliant plants perceive to be obstacles to pollution control. Non-compliant firms made less effort than compliant firms to change materials, used, to change production processes, or to install end-of-pipe treatment equipment. They had significantly fewer programs to train their general workers in environmental responsibilities. They lagged behind in environmental training, waste management, and transportation training. They received less technical training, especially about the environment, environmental policy and administration, and clean technology and audits. Responses about obstacles to better environmental performance included scarcity of training resources, government bureaucracy, high interest rates, and Mexico's lack of an environmental protection culture. Respondents said that senior managers did not emphasize the environment, assigned more priority to economic considerations, and were not trained in the subject. Most important, however, little information was available about Mexico's environmental policy. These findings suggest the importance of technical assistance - especially training and information. In Mexico, the information gap on policy is a major problem. Mexican environmental agencies should invest more in technical assistance and environmental training targeted to non-compliant enterprises. Environmental education, especially of senior managers, could significantly improve pollution control. Maintaining close contact with non-compliant firms, designing programs targeted to them, and pursuing them systemically should increase their responsiveness to regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Dasgupta, Susmita, 1999. "Opportunities for improving environmental compliance in Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2245, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2245
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/12/30/000094946_99120905324449/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raymond Hartman & David Wheeler & Manjula Singh, 1997. "The cost of air pollution abatement," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(6), pages 759-774.
    2. Hettige, Hemamala & Huq, Mainul & Pargal, Sheoli & Wheeler, David, 1996. "Determinants of pollution abatement in developing countries: Evidence from South and Southeast Asia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(12), pages 1891-1904, December.
    3. Magat, Wesley A & Viscusi, W Kip, 1990. "Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 331-360, October.
    4. Susmita Dasgupta & Mainul Huq & David Wheeler & Chonghua Zhang, 2001. "Water pollution abatement by Chinese industry: cost estimates and policy implications," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(4), pages 547-557.
    5. Lanoie, Paul & Laplante, Benoit & Roy, Maite, 1997. "Can capital markets create incentives for pollution control?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1753, The World Bank.
    6. Laplante, Benoit & Rilstone, Paul, 1996. "Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 19-36, July.
    7. Paul Lanoie & Benoit Laplante & Maité Roy, 1997. "Can Capital Markets Create Incentives for Pollution Control?," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-05, CIRANO.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dalton, Timothy J. & Lilja, Nina K. & Johnson, Nancy & Howeler, Reinhardt, 2011. "Farmer Participatory Research and Soil Conservation in Southeast Asian Cassava Systems," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(12), pages 2176-2186.
    2. Juan C. Belausteguigoitia & Gustavo Merino & Ricardo Samaniego, 2002. "La Inserción de la Gestión Ambiental en las Políticas Sectoriales de Latinoamérica y el Caribe: El Caso de los Sectores Energético e Industrial en México," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 9064, Inter-American Development Bank.
    3. Kevin P. Gallagher, "undated". "Is NACEC a Model Trade and Environment Institution? Lessons from Mexican Industry," GDAE Working Papers 01-08, GDAE, Tufts University.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dasgupta, Susmita & Hettige, Hemamala & Wheeler, David, 2000. "What Improves Environmental Compliance? Evidence from Mexican Industry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 39-66, January.
    2. Dasgupta, Susmita & Hettige, Hemamala & Wheeler, David, 1998. "What improves environmental performance? evidence from Mexican industry," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1877, The World Bank.
    3. Hettige, Hemamala & Mani, Muthukumara & Wheeler, David, 2000. "Industrial pollution in economic development: the environmental Kuznets curve revisited," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 445-476, August.
    4. Gangadharan, Lata, 2006. "Environmental compliance by firms in the manufacturing sector in Mexico," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 477-486, October.
    5. Keren Priyadarshini & Omprakash K. Gupta, 2003. "Compliance to Environmental Regulations: The Indian Context," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 2(1), pages 9-26, April.
    6. Dasgupta, Susmita & Huq, Mainul & Wheeler, David, 1997. "Bending the rules : discretionary pollution control in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1761, The World Bank.
    7. Seroa da Motta, Ronaldo, 2006. "Analyzing the environmental performance of the Brazilian industrial sector," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 269-281, May.
    8. Rachel Bouvier, 2009. "Determinants of Environmental Performance," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 23(2), pages 111-126, May.
    9. Ronaldo Seroa da Motta, 2015. "Analyzing the Environmental Performance of the Brazilian Industrial Sector," Discussion Papers 0137, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
    10. Wang, Hua & Jin, Yanhong H., 2002. "Ownership And Industrial Pollution Control: Evidence From China," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19671, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    11. Zhengxia He & Shichun Xu & Wenxing Shen & Meiling Wang & Cunfang Li, 2019. "Exploring external and internal pressures on the environmental behavior of paper enterprises in China: A qualitative study," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(6), pages 951-969, September.
    12. Kjetil Telle, 2004. "Effects of inspections on plants' regulatory and environmental performance - evidence from Norwegian manufacturing industries," Discussion Papers 381, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    13. Gaoussou Diarra & Sébastien Marchand, 2011. "Environmental Compliance, Corruption and Governance: Theory and Evidence on Forest Stock in Developing Countries," Working Papers halshs-00557677, HAL.
    14. Basu, Arnab K. & Chau, Nancy H., 2001. "Market Access Rivalry and Eco-labeling Standards: Are Eco-labels Non-tariff Barriers in Disguise?," Working Papers 127662, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    15. Du, Limin & Hanley, Aoife & Wei, Chu, 2015. "Estimating the Marginal Abatement Cost Curve of CO2 Emissions in China: Provincial Panel Data Analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 217-229.
    16. Rakesh Kumar Jain & Surender Kumar, 2018. "Shadow price of CO2 emissions in Indian thermal power sector," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 20(4), pages 879-902, October.
    17. Iulie Aslaksen & Terje Synnestvedt, 2003. "Ethical investment and the incentives for corporate environmental protection and social responsibility," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 212-223, December.
    18. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson & Dietrich Earnhart, 2022. "The role of experience in deterring crime: A theory of specific versus general deterrence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(4), pages 1833-1853, October.
    19. André, Francisco J. & Sokri, Abderrahmane & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Public Disclosure Programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 212(1), pages 199-212, July.
    20. Dietrich Earnhart & Lana Friesen, 2021. "Enforcement Federalism: Comparing the Effectiveness of Federal Punishment versus State Punishment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(2), pages 227-255, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2245. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roula I. Yazigi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dvewbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.