An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining
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- Houba, Harold, 1993. "An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 253-256.
References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
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- Suh, Sang-Chul & Wen, Quan, 2006.
"Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-73, February.
- Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003. "Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0306, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2000. "Bargaining with asymmetric threat points," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 333-339, December.
- Houba, Harold, 1997. "The policy bargaining model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-27, August.
- Harold Houba, 2005. "Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-063/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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