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On Concept Lattices of Efficiently Solvable Voting Protocols

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  • Stefano Vannucci

Abstract

It is shown that concept lattices can be attached in a natural way to any voting protocol. The concept lattices of some voting protocols that are solvable with respect to some prominnent solution concepts and outcome-efficient are studied: it is proved that they typically amount to chains

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Vannucci, 2006. "On Concept Lattices of Efficiently Solvable Voting Protocols," Department of Economics University of Siena 489, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:489
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    File URL: http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/489.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    2. Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef, 1995. "Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 172-190, May.
    3. Danilov, V. I. & Sotskov, A. I., 1993. "On strongly consistent social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 327-346.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcello Basili & Stefano Vannucci, 2013. "Diversity as width," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 913-936, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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