La Crema: A case study of mutual fire insurance
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn, 1993.
"The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 792-810, September.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S. & Loury, G., 1990. "The Economics Of Rotating Savings And Credit Associations," Working papers 556, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S. & Loury, G., 1992. "The economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," Papers 157, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, 1992. "The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 24, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S. & Loury, G., 1990. "The Economics Of Rotating Savings And Credit Associations," Papers 149, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
- Gulley, O. David & Scott, Frank A. Jr., 1989. "Lottery Effects on Pari-Mutuel Tax Revenues," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 42(1), pages 89-93, March.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, 1994. "Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Credit Markets and Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 701-719.
- Gulley, O. David & Scott, Frank A. Jr., 1989. "Lottery Effects on Pari-Mutuel Tax Revenues," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 42(1), pages 89-93, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daniel J. Clarke, 2011. "Reinsuring the Poor: Group Microinsurance Design and Costly State Verification," Economics Series Working Papers 573, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015.
"Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
- Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Catarina GoulÃ£o & Luca Panaccione, 2015. "Pooling promises with moral hazard," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(1), pages 460-465.
- Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2013. "Networks, Commitment, and Competence: Caste in Indian Local Politics," NBER Working Papers 19197, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Assefa, Tsion Taye & Meuwissen, Miranda P.M. & Van Asseldonk, Marcel A.P.M., "undated". "Mutual insurance companies as a tool for farmer income stabilization: performance and prospects in the CAP," 126th Seminar, June 27-29, 2012, Capri, Italy 125991, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Lanny Arvan & David Nickerson, 2006. "Private Investment, Public Aid and Endogenous Divergence in the Evolution of Urban Neighborhoods," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 83-100, February.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003.
"The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules,"
2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
More about this item
KeywordsInsurance; contract theory; mechanism design; truthful revelation;
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:518. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://www.econ.upf.edu/ .