How Rome enabled impersonal markets
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Ulrike Malmendier, 2009. "Law and Finance "at the Origin"," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1076-1108, December.
- Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, 2013. "Slavery and Information," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(01), pages 79-116, March.
- ., 2013. "Application to institutional economics," Chapters,in: Change and Continuity at the World Bank, chapter 7, pages 84-95 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Benito Arruñada, 2010.
"Institutional Support of the Firm: A Theory of Business Registries,"
508, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Benito Arruñada, 2010. "Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries," Economics Working Papers 1195, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2010.
- Peter Temin, 2006. "The Economy of the Early Roman Empire," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 133-151, Winter.
- Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2014. "Tax farming and the origins of state capacity in England and France," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 1-20.
- David Kessler & Peter Temin, 2007. "The organization of the grain trade in the early Roman Empire," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 60(2), pages 313-332, May.
- Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008.
"The law and economics of self-dealing,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 430-465, June.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing," NBER Working Papers 11883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008. "The Law and Economics of Self-dealing," Scholarly Articles 2907526, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Hansmann, Henry & Kraakman, Reinier, 2002. "Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 373-420, June.
- Benito ArruÒada, 2003. "Property Enforcement as Organized Consent," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 401-444, October.
- ., 2013. "The genesis of a governing institution," Chapters,in: The Political Power of the Business Corporation, chapter 1, pages 1-20 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Arrunada, Benito & Garicano, Luis & Vazquez, Luis, 2001.
"Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution,"
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 257-284, April.
- Benito Arruñada & Luis Garicano & Luis Vázquez, 1999. "Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution," Economics Working Papers 424, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- repec:hrv:faseco:30747165 is not listed on IDEAS
- North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, December.
- Brickley, James A & Dark, Frederick H & Weisbach, Michael S, 1991.
"The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 101-132, April.
- Brickley, J.A. & Dark, F.H. & Weisbach, M.S., 1988. "The Economic Effects Of Franchise Termination Laws," Papers 88-11, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- ., 2013. "Vulnerability of institutions and rules," Chapters,in: Government Failure, chapter 9, pages 91-106 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Koyama, Mark, 2010. "Evading the 'Taint of Usury': The usury prohibition as a barrier to entry," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 420-442, October.
More about this item
Keywordsproperty rights; enforcement; transaction costs; Roman law; impersonal exchange; personal exchange; New Institutional Economics; Law and Economics.;
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- N13 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://www.econ.upf.edu/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.