How Rome Enabled Impersonal Markets
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Ulrike Malmendier, 2009. "Law and Finance "at the Origin"," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1076-1108, December.
- Benito ArruÒada, 2003. "Property Enforcement as Organized Consent," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 401-444, October.
- Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, 2013. "Slavery and Information," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(01), pages 79-116, March.
- ., 2013. "The genesis of a governing institution," Chapters,in: The Political Power of the Business Corporation, chapter 1, pages 1-20 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Arrunada, Benito & Garicano, Luis & Vazquez, Luis, 2001.
"Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution,"
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 257-284, April.
- Benito Arruñada & Luis Garicano & Luis Vázquez, 1999. "Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution," Economics Working Papers 424, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- repec:hrv:faseco:30747165 is not listed on IDEAS
- ., 2013. "Application to institutional economics," Chapters,in: Change and Continuity at the World Bank, chapter 7, pages 84-95 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Benito Arruñada, 2010.
"Institutional Support of the Firm: A Theory of Business Registries,"
508, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Benito Arruñada, 2010. "Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries," Economics Working Papers 1195, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2010.
- Peter Temin, 2006. "The Economy of the Early Roman Empire," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 133-151, Winter.
- Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008.
"The law and economics of self-dealing,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 430-465, June.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing," NBER Working Papers 11883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008. "The Law and Economics of Self-dealing," Scholarly Articles 2907526, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, April.
- Brickley, James A & Dark, Frederick H & Weisbach, Michael S, 1991.
"The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 101-132, April.
- Brickley, J.A. & Dark, F.H. & Weisbach, M.S., 1988. "The Economic Effects Of Franchise Termination Laws," Papers 88-11, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2014. "Tax farming and the origins of state capacity in England and France," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 1-20.
- David Kessler & Peter Temin, 2007. "The organization of the grain trade in the early Roman Empire," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 60(2), pages 313-332, May.
- ., 2013. "Vulnerability of institutions and rules," Chapters,in: Government Failure, chapter 9, pages 91-106 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Hansmann, Henry & Kraakman, Reinier, 2002. "Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 373-420, June.
- Koyama, Mark, 2010. "Evading the 'Taint of Usury': The usury prohibition as a barrier to entry," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 420-442, October.
More about this item
KeywordsProperty rights; enforcement; transaction costs; Roman law; impersonal exchange; personal exchange; New Institutional Economics; Law and Economics;
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- N13 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-03-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2016-03-17 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2016-03-17 (Law & Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:881. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruno Guallar). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/bargses.html .