The Last will be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies with Positional Externalities
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References listed on IDEAS
- Thomas Demuynck & P. Jean‐Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2019.
"The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments,"
Econometric Society, vol. 87(1), pages 111-138, January.
- Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo Saulle & Christian Seel, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-02, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Thomas Demuynck & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," ET: Economic Theory 258008, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Working Papers 2017.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Demuynck, Thomas & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Research Memorandum 002, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
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- repec:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-016-0989-5 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywordsgroup formation; segregation; relative payoff; Egalitarianism; Meritocracy; social environment;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2019-01-07 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2019-01-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2019-01-07 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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