Internal labour markets: a case study
We select one firm from a large data set of firms and study its internal economics. First we prove that the information available allows us to inspect the personnel policies of the firm. Furthermore, this fact allows moving from the case study to more comprehensive studies in personnel economics using institutional surveys. The analysis also shows the patterns of workers' promotions and the differences in the characteristics of insider versus outsider workers. The decision to promote is analyzed. The hierarchic design directly influences the wage policy. Wages are determined to a great extent by the layers of the hierarchy. There are wage premiums upon promotion, even if the worker does not change his place in the organization. When the promoted worker moves up in the hierarchy he comes from the top of the wage distribution at the old job and goes to the bottom of it in the new job. We present evidence on workers' exit and entry to the bottom of the wage distribution, especially in the lower part of the hierarchy.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisboa|
Phone: (351) 21 3801638
Fax: (351) 21 3870933
Web page: http://www.fe.unl.pt
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ariga, Kenn & Brunello, Giorgio & Ohkusa, Yasushi, 1997.
"Fast Track: Is it in the Genes? The Promotion Policy of a Large Japanese Firm,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1622, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ariga, Kenn & Ohkusa, Yasushi & Brunello, Giorgio, 1999. "Fast track: is it in the genes? The promotion policy of a large Japanese firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 385-402, April.
- Edward P. Lazear, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," NBER Working Papers 6957, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, 1987.
"Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 453-476.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1984. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 708R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised 1985.
- McCue, Kristin, 1996. "Promotions and Wage Growth," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 175-209, April.
- Baker, George & Gibbs, Michael & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1993. "Hierarchies and compensation: A case study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 366-378, April.
- Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-70, October.
- Manove, Michael, 1997. "Job Responsibility, Pay and Promotion," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(440), pages 85-103, January.
- James L. Medoff & Katharine G. Abraham, 1980.
"Experience, Performance, and Earnings,"
NBER Working Papers
0278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dan Bernhardt, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 315-339.
- Ricart i Costa, Joan E, 1988. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 449-66, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp378. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sean Story)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.