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Financial sector compensation and excess risk-taking—a consideration of the issues and policy lessons

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  • Krishnan Sharma

Abstract

This paper surveys the ways that the structure and magnitude of financial sector compensation can generate incentives for excessive risk taking. It also highlights the underlying economic and institutional forces that have underpinned and sustained these pay structures, including aspects of corporate governance in financial institutions, regulatory capture by financial elites, the nature of the labour market for finance professionals and the extended economic boom of the 1990s and 2000s. The measures endorsed by the Financial Stability Board and the G20 for sound compensation practices do not go far enough in several areas; a broader set of measures need consideration.

Suggested Citation

  • Krishnan Sharma, 2012. "Financial sector compensation and excess risk-taking—a consideration of the issues and policy lessons," Working Papers 115, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    • Handle: RePEc:une:wpaper:115
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    File URL: http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, 2009. "Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry: 1909-2006," NBER Working Papers 14644, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. James Crotty, 2009. "The Bonus-Driven “Rainmaker” Financial Firm: How These Firms Enrich Top Employees, Destroy Shareholder Value and Create Systemic Financial Instability," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2009-13, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    3. Kempf, Alexander & Ruenzi, Stefan & Thiele, Tanja, 2009. "Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 92-108, April.
    4. Paul Oyer, 2006. "The Making of an Investment Banker: Macroeconomic Shocks, Career Choice, and Lifetime Income," NBER Working Papers 12059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 2009. "What Lessons Can We Learn from the Boom and Turmoil?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 29(1), pages 53-63, Winter.
    6. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005. "Has financial development made the world riskier?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 313-369.
    7. James Crotty, 2010. "The Bonus-Driven “Rainmaker” Financial Firm: How These Firms Enrich Top Employees, Destroy Shareholder Value and Create Systemic Financial Instability (revised)," Working Papers wp209_revised3, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bottasso, Anna & Duchêne, Sébastien & Guerci, Eric & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Noussair, Charles N., 2022. "Higher order risk attitudes of financial experts," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).
    2. Daniel Ofori-Sasu & Emmanuel Sarpong-Kumankoma & Saint Kuttu & Elikplimi Komla Agbloyor & Joshua Yindenaba Abor, 2024. "Risk-taking and systemic banking crisis in Africa: do regulatory policy framework provide new insight in threshold models?," Risk Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 26(2), pages 1-37, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial market compensation; financial institutions; excess risk-taking; magnitude and structure of pay; governance of compensation; labour market mobility; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs

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