Market Discipline under Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies
This paper shows that systemic risk exerts a significant impact on the behavior of depositors, sometimes overshadowing their responses to standard bank fundamentals. Systemic risk can affect market discipline both regardless of and through bank fundamentals. First, worsening systemic conditions can directly threaten the value of deposits via dual agency problems. Second, systemic shocks can lead to a future deterioration of fundamentals and affect the exposure to systemic risk, not captured by standard fundamentals. Using data from the recent banking crises in Argentina and Uruguay, we show that market discipline is indeed quite robust once systemic risk is factored in. As the latter increases, the informational content of past fundamentals declines. These episodes also illustrate how few systemic shocks can trigger a run irrespective of ex-ante fundamentals. Overall, the evidence suggests that, in emerging economies, the notion of market discipline needs to account for systemic risk.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Miñones 2177 - (1428) Buenos Aires|
Web page: http://www.utdt.edu/listado_contenidos.php?id_item_menu=4994
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Schmukler, Sergio L., 1999. "Do depositors punish banks for"bad"behavior? : market discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2058, The World Bank.
- Goldberg, Lawrence G. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 1996. "Response of uninsured depositors to impending S&L failures: Evidence of depositor discipline," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 311-325.
- Abhiman Das & Saibal Ghosh, 2004. "Market Discipline In The Indian Banking Sector: An Empirical Exploration," Finance 0410020, EconWPA.
- Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Augusto de la Torre & Sergio Schmukler, 2003.
"Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina´s Currency Board,"
Business School Working Papers
catorce, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Augusto de la Torre & Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2003. "Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina’s Currency Board," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 43-108, January.
- De la Torre, Augusto & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2003. "Living and dying with hard pegs : the rise and fall of Argentina's currency board," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2980, The World Bank.
- Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 2001.
"Causes of U.S. bank distress during the depression,"
714, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 2000. "Causes of U.S. Bank Distress During the Depression," NBER Working Papers 7919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991.
"Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
- Tom Doan, "undated". "RATS program to replicate Arellano-Bond 1991 dynamic panel," Statistical Software Components RTZ00169, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Gary Gorton, 1986.
"Banking panics and business cycles,"
86-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 1998.
"Public Disclosure and Bank Failures,"
IMF Staff Papers,
Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(1), pages 110-131, March.
- Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2004. "Market Discipline in Emerging Economies: Beyond Bank Fundamentals," Business School Working Papers marketdiscipline, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Sironi, Andrea, 2003.
" Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 443-72, June.
- Andrea Sironi, 2000. "Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: evidence from subordinated debt issues," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-40, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Brenda Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999. "Determinants of Ex-Ante Banking System Distress; A Macro-Micro Empirical Exploration of Some Recent Episodes," IMF Working Papers 99/33, International Monetary Fund.
- Roberto Steiner & Adolfo Barajas, 2000. "Depositor Behavior and Market Discipline in Colombia," IMF Working Papers 00/214, International Monetary Fund.
- Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
- Schumacher, Liliana, 2000. "Bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net: Argentina and the 'tequila' shock," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 257-277, August.
- Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
- Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
- Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000. "Subordinated debt as bank capital: a proposal for regulatory reform," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 40-53.
- Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2001.
"Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 1029-1051, 06.
- María Soledad Martínez-Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2002. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 143-174 Central Bank of Chile.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:systemicrisk. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nicolás Del Ponte)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.