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Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets

Author

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  • Jullien, Bruno
  • Pavan, Alessandro

Abstract

We study monopoly and duopoly pricing in a two-sided market with dispersed information about users' preferences. We first show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation rates and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and thereby the equilibrium prices. We then study informative advertising campaigns and product design affecting the agents' ability to estimate their own valuations and/or the distribution of valuations on the other side of the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Jullien, Bruno & Pavan, Alessandro, 2013. "Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets," TSE Working Papers 13-429, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:27584
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li, 2007. "Price discrimination and efficient matching," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 243-263, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gomes, Renato & Pavan, Alessandro, 2016. "Many-to-many matching and price discrimination," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    two-sided markets; dispersed information; platform competition; global-games; informative advertising;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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