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Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information

  • Jullien, Bruno
  • Pavan, Alessandro

We study monopoly and duopoly pricing in a two-sided market with dispersed information about users' preferences. We first show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation rates and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and thereby the equilibrium prices. We then study informative advertising campaigns and product design affecting the agents' ability to estimate their own valuations and/or the distribution of valuations on the other side of the market.

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Paper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 13-429.

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Date of creation: Aug 2013
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Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:27584
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Web page: http://www.tse-fr.eu/

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  1. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-59, September.
  2. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
  3. Hanna Halaburda & Yaron Yehezkel, 2011. "Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 11-05, NET Institute, revised Sep 2011.
  4. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li, 2007. "Price discrimination and efficient matching," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 243-263, February.
  5. Renault, Régis & Anderson, Simon P., 2009. "Comparative advertising: disclosing horizontal match information," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/12478, Paris Dauphine University.
  6. Cabral, Luís M B, 2008. "Dynamic Price Competition with Network Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 6687, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Attila Ambrus & Rossella Argenziano, 2009. "Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 17-52, February.
  8. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2007. "Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 353-380, August.
  9. Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, 2002. "Advertising Content," Virginia Economics Online Papers 362, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  10. Attila Ambrus & Emilio Calvano & Markus Reisinger, 2014. "Either or Both Competition: A "Two-sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships," CSEF Working Papers 378, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  11. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. " Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-28, Summer.
  12. Andrei Hagiu, 2009. "Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(4), pages 1011-1043, December.
  13. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Mitchell, Matthew F., 2005. "Network Externalities and Long-Run Market Shares," Research Papers 1879, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  14. E. Glen Weyl, 2010. "A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1642-72, September.
  15. Susan Athey & Emilio Calvano & Joshua S. Gans, 2014. "The Impact of the Internet on Advertising Markets for News Media," CSEF Working Papers 379, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  16. Amelio, Andrea & Jullien, Bruno, 2007. "Tying and Freebies in Two-Sided Markets," IDEI Working Papers 445, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  17. repec:hrv:faseco:4589709 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing cybermediaries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 797-808, May.
  19. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination," Discussion Papers 1578, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1986. "A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 366-376, Autumn.
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