IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion

  • Seldeslachts, Jo
  • Duso, Tomaso
  • Pennings, Enrico

Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint ventures (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US Nation Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 240.

in new window

Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:240
Contact details of provider: Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-3405
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3510
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Helder Vasconcelos, 2004. "Entry Effects on Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 219-241, 05.
  2. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  3. Ordover, Janusz A & Baumol, William J, 1988. "Antitrust Policy and High-Technology Industries," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(4), pages 13-34, Winter.
  4. Thomas W. Ross, 2009. "Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 31-54, May.
  5. Vonortas, Nicholas S., 1997. "Research joint ventures in the US," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4-5), pages 577-595, December.
  6. Eliane Catilina & Robert Feinberg, 2006. "Market Power and Incentives to Form Research Consortia," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 129-144, 03.
  7. Cabral, Luis M. B., 2000. "R&D cooperation and product market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1033-1047, October.
  8. Reuer, Jeffrey J. & Zollo, Maurizio, 2005. "Termination outcomes of research alliances," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 101-115, February.
  9. Tomaso Duso & Enrico Pennings & Jo Seldeslachts, 2008. "The Dynamics of Research Joint Ventures: A Panel Data Analysis," CIG Working Papers SP II 2007-12, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:240. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tamilla Benkelberg)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.