Extended RJV cooperation and social welfare
A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the final market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical improvement is large, so that the introduction of the innovation is more valuable.
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