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Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures

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  • Thomas W. Ross

Abstract

Antitrust agencies and courts have expressed concerns that joint ventures and strategic alliances between firms that compete in other markets might serve to reduce the vigor of their competition. This article explores a mechanism through which a joint venture between two (or more) firms in one market can serve to facilitate collusion in another market--even one unconnected vertically or horizontally by costs or demand. In the models studied here, play in one market has the effect of altering players' beliefs about their rivals' play in the second market. A joint venture in one market may provide a credible punishment mechanism for firms colluding in another market. The joint venture may also provide a vehicle for the transmission, between players, of information in a way that helps cooperative types find each other and collude in other markets. (JEL L12, L41, K21) The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas W. Ross, 2009. "Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 31-54, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:25:y:2009:i:1:p:31-54
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewm051
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michelle S. Goeree & Eric Helland, 2009. "Do research joint ventures serve a collusive function?," IEW - Working Papers 448, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2012.
    2. Tomaso Duso & Lars-Hendrik Röller & Jo Seldeslachts, 2014. "Collusion Through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 96(2), pages 349-370, May.
    3. Gianluca Femminis & Gianmaria Martini, 2008. "Extended RJV cooperation and social welfare," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0852, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    4. Chen, Zhiqi & Ross, Thomas W., 2020. "Buffer joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    5. J. Seldeslachts & T. Duso & E. Pennings, 2012. "On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion," Review of Business and Economic Literature, Intersentia, vol. 57(1), pages 98-109, March.
    6. Krämer Jan & Vogelsang Ingo, 2016. "Co-Investments and Tacit Collusion in Regulated Network Industries: Experimental Evidence," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 35-61, March.
    7. Clémence Christin, 2013. "Entry Deterrence Through Cooperative R&D Over-Investment," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 79(2), pages 5-26.
    8. Andreas Nicklisch, 2012. "Does collusive advertising facilitate collusive pricing? Evidence from experimental duopolies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 515-532, December.
    9. Normann, Hans-Theo & Rösch, Jürgen & Schultz, Luis Manuel, 2015. "Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 72-84.
    10. Dollinger, Jérôme & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2023. "R&D and Market Sharing Agreements," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2023004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Sovinsky, Michelle & Helland, Eric, 2019. "Do Research Joint Ventures Serve a Collusive Function?," CEPR Discussion Papers 13533, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Georgieva, Dobrina & Jandik, Tomas & Lee, Wayne Y., 2012. "The impact of laws, regulations, and culture on cross-border joint ventures," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 774-795.
    13. Albert Jolink & Eva Niesten, 2012. "Hybrid Governance," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Sovinsky, Michelle & Eric Helland, 2013. "Do Research Joint Ventures Serve a Collusive Function?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1030, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    15. Alberto Zazzaro, 2011. "The Costs of Inter-Firm Networks," QA - Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, Associazione Rossi Doria, issue 4, December.
    16. Xin Geng & Harish Krishnan & Milind G. Sohoni, 2022. "Operational collaboration between rivals: The impact of cost reduction," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(4), pages 1856-1871, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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