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On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion

Listed author(s):
  • J. Seldeslachts
  • T. Duso
  • E. Pennings

Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint venture (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion.

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Article provided by Intersentia in its journal Review of Business and Economic Literature (ReBEL).

Volume (Year): 57 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 98-109

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Handle: RePEc:sen:rebelj:v:57:i:1:y:2012:p:98-109
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.rebel-journal.org/

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  1. Vonortas, Nicholas S., 1997. "Research joint ventures in the US," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4-5), pages 577-595, December.
  2. Duso, Tomaso & Pennings, Enrico & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2007. "The Dynamics of Research Joint Ventures: A Panel Data Analysis," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 221, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  3. Martin, Stephen, 1996. "R & D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 733-741, April.
  4. Eliane Catilina & Robert Feinberg, 2006. "Market Power and Incentives to Form Research Consortia," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(2), pages 129-144, 03.
  5. Ordover, Janusz A & Baumol, William J, 1988. "Antitrust Policy and High-Technology Industries," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(4), pages 13-34, Winter.
  6. Cabral, Luis M. B., 2000. "R&D cooperation and product market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1033-1047, October.
  7. Helder Vasconcelos, 2004. "Entry Effects on Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 24(3), pages 219-241, 05.
  8. Reuer, Jeffrey J. & Zollo, Maurizio, 2005. "Termination outcomes of research alliances," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 101-115, February.
  9. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  10. Thomas W. Ross, 2009. "Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 31-54, May.
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