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On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion

Author

Listed:
  • J. Seldeslachts
  • T. Duso
  • E. Pennings

Abstract

Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint venture (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Seldeslachts & T. Duso & E. Pennings, 2012. "On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion," Review of Business and Economic Literature, Intersentia, vol. 57(1), pages 98-109, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sen:rebelj:v:57:i:1:y:2012:p:98-109
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    Cited by:

    1. Banal-Estañol, Albert & Duso, Tomaso & Seldeslachts, Jo & Szücs, Florian, 2022. "R&D Spillovers through RJV Cooperation," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 51(4), pages 1-10.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods

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